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This paper traces how the Supreme Courts of Canada and the 
United States have each used the basic guarantee of adjudicative
fairness in their respective constitutions to effect revolutions in their 
countries’ criminal justice systems, through two different 
jurisprudential models for this development.  It identifies a 
relationship between two core constitutional structures, the basic 
guarantee and enumerated rights, and shows how this relationship can 
affect the degree to which entrenched constitutional rights actually 
protect individuals.  It explains that the different models for the 
relationship between the basic guarantee and enumerated rights 
adopted in Canada and the United States, an “expansive view” and a 
“narrow view” respectively, changed the degree to which entrenched 
rights protected individuals. It offers an historical context for these 
developments, and gives a comparison between a heretofore 
unexamined parallel in the jurisprudential developments surrounding 
the basic guarantee in both countries.  It then suggests how these 
different models for the relationship between the fundamental 
constitutional structures protecting individual rights in the criminal 
process will respond to the most significant threats to individual rights 
from the political branches in decades, as a result of the global war on 
terrorism.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
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2accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.1
[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.2
The world is becoming “juridified.”  An increasing number of 
countries are entrenching3 guarantees of individual rights in 
constitutional texts that must be interpreted and enforced by an 
independent judiciary.  This has prompted a debate as to whether this 
is good or bad.4  Some argue that the process of juridification, or the 
“judicialization of politics,”5 is ultimately anti-democratic, because it 
gives primacy to courts and judges, rather than the political branches.6
1CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), § 7.
2U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 637, 
note 13 (1991).  (Defining this use of the term, and distinguishing entrenched rights 
from those immunized from constitutional amendment. “Entrenchment” here is used 
simply to mean constitutionalization, either through placing the right in a 
constitutional text or judicially giving it constitutional status, or otherwise placing 
the right beyond removal or change through the ordinary political process.)
4See Mark Tushnet, Skepticism About Judicial Review - A Perspective From the 
United States, Geo. Univ. Law Ctr. 2000 Working Papers Series, 6 Working Paper 
No. XXXXXX; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=XXXXX.  
(noting U.S. experience with judicial review in name of fundamental human rights is 
“significantly shorter and more ambiguous than one might have thought”).
5Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the 
Courts?, Research Paper No. 03-02 (February 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=380283, at 4 (citing Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron).
6Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, chs. 6-7 (1999); 
Mark Tushnet, Scepticism about Judicial Review: A Perspective from the United 
States, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 359 (2001); See MICHAEL MANDEL, THE 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA 2d ed., (1994). 
(For a Canadian perspective on how the Charter has been anti-democratic in form 
and content because it allows judges to cloak ideological choices beneath mantle of 
neutral interpretation of the law); James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in 
Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy, 65 MODERN LAW REVIEW
204, 207 (March 2002). (James Tully has described the problem of constitutionalism 
gaining priority over democracy this way: “If the principle of constitutionalism gains 
priority over the principle of democracy, so the constitution is the foundation of 
democratic rights and institutions but is not itself subject to democratic deliberation, 
then the association [between democracy and constitutionalism] is illegitimate.”)
3Others argue that juridification enhances democracy, by protecting 
minorities and individual rights, and providing a counterweight to the 
political branches.7
Overlooked in this debate is that how rights are entrenched, and 
when similarly entrenched how courts enforce them, can be as 
important as whether they are entrenched at all in determining how 
effectively they actually protect individuals.  Comparing the operation 
of constitutions, as opposed to simply comparing their texts, is a tricky 
business.  Even when constitutions have very similar rights entrenched 
in very similar ways, varying judicial approaches to their enforcement 
can make for dramatically different degrees of protection for 
individuals.  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United 
States Constitution both entrench protections for individuals in the 
criminal process through combining an open-ended basic guarantee of 
adjudicative fairness8 (“fundamental justice” in Canada and “due 
process” in the United States) with specific enumerated procedural 
rights (counsel, search and seizure, etc.).9  The Supreme Courts of both 
countries have used this combination to revolutionize their country’s 
criminal justice system,10 yet have done so by creating very different 
7Oliver Gerstenberg, Expanding the Constitution Beyond the Court: The Case of 
Euro-Constitutionalism, 8 EUR. L. J. 172 (March 2002).  (A recent description of the 
European version of this debate, arising from the developing notion of a 
“constitution” of Europe under which the European Court of Justice must determine 
EC Member States’ derogations from the principles of free trade and movement in 
order to maintain a decent standard of living for disadvantaged groups, is this: “We 
seem to be left with an unattractive choice between either the concern that 
constitutionalism will take over too much of the terrain that belongs to democratic 
government, assuming substantive moral or political values come to be judicially 
recognised and enforced – or endorsing a chastening of constitutional aspiration 
through a relaxation of participatory and substantive protective standards, i.e. a 
variety of ‘economic constitutionalism.’” )
8Supra notes 1and 2.  (This cumbersome phrase is meant to convey simply that the 
guarantee is a generalized one (rather than a guarantee of a specific right or 
privilege), that it ostensibly involves the judiciary rather than other branches of 
government, and that it conveys some sense of a goal of equity.)  
9CAN. CONST.  (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), §§ 8-14; U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI and VIII.
10See §§ III.A. & B., infra.
4models of the relationship between these two types of constitutional 
protections.  This paper compares the models of this relationship 
established in both countries, traces how these different models affect 
jurisprudential development, and suggests how these models will 
affect future development of the protections.      
Adoption of these different models matters, and more than just 
to academics.  Both countries have recently enacted legislation that 
significantly impacts, and undeniably restricts, individual rights by 
expanding government authority as part of the war on terrorism.11  The 
Supreme Courts of both Canada and the United States will inevitably 
test these laws against the requirements of each constitution’s basic 
guarantee of adjudicative fairness and various enumerated rights.  
When these tests come, their outcomes will be determined by the 
different models each court has developed for the relationship between 
the two types of constitutional protections.12  The model adopted in 
Canada, in which the basic guarantee of fundamental justice is viewed 
expansively, could be much more effective at openly identifying these 
restrictions and ensuring these individual protections are maintained, 
although certain structural features of the Charter permit the Court to 
avoid this role if it so chooses.  The United States Supreme Court, 
because it has adopted a narrow model of due process, will find the 
task of identifying constitutional violations from the new restrictions 
much more difficult, although violations it does identify are more 
likely to translate into actual protections.
How well entrenched rights actually protect individuals is a 
function not only of their text (which can readily be compared here) 
and the judicial interpretations given them, but also of the entire 
constitutional structure within which they exist.  While the Supreme 
Court of Canada has adopted an “expansive” model for interpreting the 
relationship between its constitution’s basic guarantee and the 
enumerated rights, it has done so within a constitutional framework 
11See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); See The 
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (“Patriot II”).  (For the Canadian 
response) See Anti-Terrorism Act (“Bill C-36”, Bill C-36 received royal assent 
December 18, 2001).  Canada Gazette, Par II, Vol. 136, Extra (07-24-2002).  See
§§V.A. & V.B., infra. 
12See §§ II.A. & II. infra.
5that is one of judicial “penultimacy” rather than supremacy.  In other 
words, while it is the constitutional task of the Canadian Supreme 
Court to say what the “law” guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is, and the Court has undertaken this task with remarkable 
gusto, it lacks the final say as to what the law under the Charter is, 
because of parliament’s ability to override its constitutional 
decisions.13  The United States Supreme Court, by contrast, says what 
the “law” guaranteed by the Constitution is in a way that cannot be 
legislatively overridden,14 yet it has created a model for interpreting 
the basic guarantee that is very narrow with respect to its capacity to 
enhance or expand rights.15
These basic structural differences between the Canadian and 
United States constitutions complicate the analysis, and could 
ultimately lead to no greater protection in Canada for individual rights 
than in the United States.  Nevertheless, the limited model of this 
relationship, adopted in the United States, gives deference to the 
13See § V.A., infra.  (The two provisions that are most significant in this regard may 
be secs 1 and 33.  Section 1 provides a means for the Court to find that a law violates 
a right protected in the Charter, but hold that the violation is nevertheless justified.    
Sec.  33, the “notwithstanding” clause, enables the legislature to override a decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting the Charter for a renewable five year 
period.  Although the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the supreme law of the land 
in Canada (sec. 52), this structure, that allows the national legislature to override the 
decisions of the Court, has been characterized as one of judicial “penultimacy” rather 
than judicial “ultimacy” as in the United States.);  See Perry, op cit. note __, at 46-
47.
14See Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-97 (2d Ed. 1986); John Ely, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST.  (The democratic tension between the popular, majoritarian judgments of 
legislatures, crafted through the political process into statutes, and the judicial review 
of these judgments by courts applying constitutional principles that supercede the 
political process has long been studied in the U.S.); See Michael Mandel, THE 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA (2d ed. 1994).  
(The enactment of the Charter in Canada has prompted similar study in Canada.  
Arguing that the Charter enables both the left and the right to present political issues 
to the Supreme Court, which can then decide them under the rubric of “principles” 
enshrined in the Charter). 
15See Cass R. Sunstein, ONE CASE AT A TIME 5-6 (1999).  (Some applaud this 
interpretive tradition of “judicial minimalism.”  Describing "decisional minimalism" 
as "democracy-promoting" and sensible in cases with "a constitutional issue of high 
complexity").
6political branches, and if the political branches in the United States 
respond to perceived external threats with dramatic changes in the 
scope of protections for individual rights, a U.S. Supreme Court that 
has adopted this limited model will likely make little difference.16  If 
the United States Supreme Court is serious about exerting the sort of 
influence it has expressed in other areas concerning structural 
constitutional issues,17 the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada bears study.
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Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (aliens captured abroad 
during combat and held in military custody outside the U.S. not entitled to habeas 
corpus or other access to federal court for relief from terms of their confinement).  
But see, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)(alleged enemy combatant entitled to consult with counsel in responding to 
government’s claim that its declaration of his involvement with plot to detonate 
“dirty” radioactive bomb in New York City satisfied “some evidence” standard 
necessary to demonstrate his detention not arbitrary).   
17See e.g. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); See Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: 
The Rehnquist Court and the Power to “Say What the Law Is,” 59 WASH. AND LEE 
L. REV. ___, ___ (2002) (For a thorough analysis of the renewed readiness of the 
Rehnquist Court to “say what the law is,”.  Explaining Court’s recent holdings 
invalidating Congress’ exercise of section 5 powers under the 14th amendment and 
holdings restricting deference to decisions of administrative agencies as “broader 
assertions of the Court’s power to interpret the constitution”).
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I. Basic Guarantees, Enumerated Rights and Judicial 
Authority
What is the relationship between a constitution’s basic 
guarantee of adjudicative fairness and specific enumerated procedural 
rights?  Over the past twenty years, there has been a dramatic increase 
in the number of written constitutions that guarantee individual rights 
through entrenched protections18 with judicial review. 19  Many of these 
have included entrenched procedural protections of the individual 
subjected to the criminal process.20
18See Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 637, 
note 13 (1991) (“Entrenchment” here is used simply to mean constitutionalization, 
either through placing the right in a constitutional text or judicially giving it 
constitutional status, or otherwise placing the right beyond removal or change 
through the ordinary political process.  Defining this use of the term, and 
distinguishing entrenched rights from those immunized from constitutional 
amendment).  see Mark Tushnet, Skepticism About Judicial Review - A Perspective 
From the United States, Geo. Univ. Law Ctr. 2000 Working Papers Series, 6 
WorkingPaperNo.XXXXXX;availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id
=XXXXX.(As to the lack of benefit from judicially “entrenched” rights through 
judicial review in the American experience). 
19Since 1980, nearly thirty countries have either adopted a written constitution which 
defines individual rights (South Africa), added specific protections for individual 
rights to such a constitution (Canada), or acceded to an international arrangement 
which provides a judicial authority for protecting textually defined individual rights 
(such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, enforced by the European Court for Human Rights).
20See, e.g., South African Constitution, §§ 12(1) (no arbitrary detention), 12(2) 
(bodily and physical integrity), 14 (search and seizure), 35 (fair trial); See also, 
8The Canadian and American approaches to entrenchment of 
procedural protections for the individual in the criminal process both 
include a basic guarantee of adjudicative fairness and enumerated 
rights.  Basic guarantees are those principles that establish minimum 
thresholds for fairness in a process of adjudication,21 but do not 
themselves prescribe the mechanism by which this result is to be 
achieved.22  Enumerated rights, by contrast, are those specific 
guarantees of particular procedures in particular circumstances.23  In 
constitutional terms, basic guarantees establish ends (fairness), but not 
means, while enumerated rights set forth means, but not ends.
Although enumerated rights afford particular procedures, in 
general they do not necessarily guarantee any particular quality of 
results.24  The results are only those “guaranteed” indirectly, as 
Jonathan H. Siegelbaum, The Right Amount of Rights: Calibrating Criminal Law and 
Procedure in Post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, 20 B.U. INT’L. L. J. 73 
(2002); Emmanuel Gross, The Magna Carta of the Defendant According to the New 
Bill of Rights in Israel  –  A Comparative Study, 8 PACE INT’L. L. REV. 91 (1996).
21§7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are examples.  
22For example, in the U.S., under the general circumstances that a state seeks to 
deprive one of life, liberty or property, it must afford due process.  This guarantee 
provides a measure of procedural quality without regard to the procedural 
components.  “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude 
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of 
evidence, whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236, (1941).  
In Canada, under the general circumstances that a person is deprived of life, liberty 
or security of the person, this must be done in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.
23U.S. Const., Amend. VI. (In the United States, in the particular circumstance of a 
criminal prosecution, the accused has the right to the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.  However, outside this particular circumstance, even though a process may 
have the same consequences (incarceration), the same procedure (counsel) is not 
afforded); CHARTER, sec. 11(c). (In Canada, in the particular circumstance that a 
person is “charged with an offense,” such person has a right (among other things) 
“not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of 
the offence.”  However, when a person is not so charged, even though their 
compelled testimony may yield derivative incriminating evidence that may be used 
against them, the same procedural protection (against incrimination) is not provided);  
Thompson Newspapers Ltd., [1990] 77 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.) (although the basic 
guarantee of fundamental justice was held to prevent this) (Wilson, J.).
24A few enumerated processes have inherent guarantees of qualitative aspects, either 
explicitly or through judicial interpretation.  In Canada, for example, §11(d) 
9necessary consequences from employing the particular procedure (e.g., 
counsel, silence, etc.) that is enumerated.  By and large, the rights 
guarantee or regulate concrete actions or entities (a trial, counsel, a 
search, a warrant, etc.), which may have qualitative components (e.g., 
a trial must be “speedy,” counsel must be “effective,” a search must be 
“reasonable,” a warrant must be based upon “probable cause”), but are 
not themselves qualitative measures.
While both of these types of entrenched protections are 
enforced through judicial review, basic guarantees carry much greater 
potential for the exercise of judicial authority than do enumerated 
rights because of their “fundamental” nature.  Basic guarantees may be 
“fundamental” in either of two different senses.  First, they may be 
fundamental as basic, or essential, requisites of any process that will 
be constitutional.  In this sense, they are requirements that an 
individual may always identify as a basis for relief25 (i.e., to be 
guarantees any person charged with an offense the right “to . . . a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”  In the United States, the right to 
counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. constitution, has been held 
a right to effective counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) 
(recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order 
“to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial . . . . [t]he Constitution guarantees a 
fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair 
trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the 
Counsel Clause.”)   Similarly, the Fourth Amendment requires that the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .” 
25For example, in the U.S. all aspects of the criminal process must satisfy the 
requisites of “due process,” even when they are in the main governed by some 
enumerated right.  Thus the U.S. Supreme Court has held that confessions and 
identifications must satisfy both the applicable enumerated right and the basic 
guarantee.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986)(considering and rejecting 
claim that notwithstanding a valid Miranda waiver under fifth amendment’s privilege 
against self incrimination there is also a violation of due process) and Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (although identifications typically governed by 6th
amendment right to counsel, which did not attach prior to indictment, due process 
still required that under the totality of the circumstances identification not be 
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification).  Abusive 
conduct by the police, even if it does not violate some enumerated right, may always 
violate the basic guarantee.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) 
(noting federal cause of action for police misconduct).  In Canada, “[w]here 
the issues before the courts involve a liberty and security interest, s. 7 is engaged and 
requires that the proceedings be conducted fairly. Accordingly, although the 
10
constitutional, any process must satisfy the basic guarantee, although if 
enumerated rights apply it must also satisfy these), even in the absence 
of an applicable enumerated right.26  Second, they may be fundamental 
as the most important requirement that any process must satisfy in 
order to be constitutional.  In this sense, they are the chief requisite for 
the constitutionality of a process, and so they can also be superior to 
enumerated provisions (i.e., they represent overarching principles), 
such that even if the applicable enumerated rights are not violated, the 
process may still violate the basic guarantee.27  The difference between 
these two senses of “fundamental” suggest different models for the 
relationship between the basic guarantees and the enumerated rights.28
These senses in which basic guarantees are “fundamental” can 
increase opportunities for the exercise of judicial authority in at least 
three ways.  First, because the basic guarantee is a qualitative measure, 
the claim that a law or rule violates something “fundamental” to the 
constitutional structure can apply to an infinite range of situations.  
Enumerated rights can address violations of the specific process 
enumerated (e.g., the right to counsel in a criminal prosecution may 
address a criminal prosecution that occurred without counsel), but they 
cannot apply beyond the enumerated scope of the right (e.g., the right 
committal hearing is not a trial, it must conform with the principles of procedural 
fairness that govern all judicial proceedings in this country, particularly those where 
a liberty or security interest is at stake.” United States of America v. Cobb, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 587, ¶32 (extradition hearing, even though not criminal proceeding, must 
comport with fundamental justice because it involves deprivation of liberty and 
security of the person). 
26See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (counsel not guaranteed by 6th
amendment in parole or probation revocation hearings, but due process may require 
counsel in particular revocation hearings to guarantee the effectiveness of other 
rights guaranteed at the hearing); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (counsel 
required by due process on direct appeal as of right, even though the existence of a 
direct appeal as of right is not constitutionally required); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1938) (counsel required by due process, although at the time not the 6th
amendment, under the circumstances of capital trial, in which defendants denied 
chance to retain counsel and denied meaningful representation by appointment of 
entire bar, as a matter of fundamental fairness). 
27See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (For example, in the U.S due 
process, not the compulsory process clause, required in camera review for disclosure 
of victim’s counseling records to defense).
28See §§II.A. and II.B., infra.
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to counsel is inapplicable to a non-criminal action).  Because basic 
guarantees afford a quality of process, rather than any particular 
process, their scope of application is effectively unlimited (e.g., the 
absence of counsel in any process, even a non-criminal one, may result 
in a process that does not satisfy the basic guarantee).  
Second, because “basic guarantees” are abstractions, they 
inherently carry much wider interpretive potential than do enumerated 
procedural protections.29  For example, the right to counsel in a 
criminal prosecution may require interpretation of the meaning of 
“counsel” or “criminal prosecution.”  This interpretation may draw 
upon history or custom, as well as bodies of theory such as politics, 
economics or philosophy, but it ultimately refers to something 
concrete  –  albeit changing  –  “counsel” and “criminal prosecution.”  
Basic guarantees are concepts, that may have reference to historical or 
customary notions, and may be informed by theories of politics, 
economics or philosophy, but they are ultimately abstractions – and 
thus susceptible to a wider range of interpretation than concrete 
entities such as “counsel” or “criminal prosecution.”
Finally, because basic guarantees represent ideas that are 
“fundamental,” in the sense of either most important or essential, they 
can always be a source for invalidating a rule or law.  This authority 
could be limited somewhat depending upon the relationship between 
enumerated rights and the basic guarantee.  For example, if the basic 
guarantee is understood to mean nothing more than simply adherence 
to the enumerated rights, than its utility as a source for exercising 
29This point is hardly new, but its significance can be lost amid claims that 
everything in the constitution is equally indeterminate.  See Frank B. Cross, 
Institutions And Enforcement of The Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL  L. REV. 1529, 1540 
(2000).  
Concepts such as due process, liberty, equal protection, and freedom itself 
are not self-defining but inevitably require value judgments.  The technical 
formalism of legal analysis cannot resolve those value judgments.  John 
Hart Ely has noted that constitutional provisions such as the ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment, the privileges and immunities clause and other 
language are “difficult to read responsibly as anything other than quite 
broad invitations to import into the constitutional decision process 
considerations that will not be found in the language of the amendment or 
the debates that led up to it.”  (Citations omitted.)
12
judicial authority will be limited to cases in which no enumerated right 
applies.  But to the extent that the basic guarantee means anything 
more than simply adherence to the enumerated rights, it is always a 
basis for exercising judicial authority.  
Moreover, this “fundamental” nature of basic guarantees, 
combined with their greater interpretative possibilities as abstractions, 
carries with it the potential for substantive, rather than simply 
procedural, review.  Since basic guarantees reflect overarching 
principles, they might be violated by a process that otherwise provides 
enumerated procedural protections.30  This greater potential for the 
exercise of judicial authority gives basic guarantees particular 
significance in measuring the judicial role in a given constitutional 
structure.  Since these two types of protections may overlap in 
particular cases,31 it is the relationship between them –   when does 
30The archetypal American constitutional example of this might be Brown v. Board 
of Educ. of Topeka.  Here a basic guarantee (equal protection), was found to have 
been violated by a practice (racial segregation) that contravened no enumerated right, 
and had been previously upheld by the Court.  Nevertheless, even theories of 
constitutional jurisprudence that limit judicial authority to invalidate legislation can 
accommodate this use of the basic guarantee.  See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Judicial 
Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 
1305, 1392-1397 (2000)  (“interpretivist” defense of Brown); See K. Michael 
Stephens, Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 13 NAT’L. J. CONT. L. 183 (2002). 
(For an originalist challenge to the Supreme Court of Canada’s current interpretation 
of section 7).
31See, e.g., CAN. CONST.  (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), § 11(d). (For the guarantee of “fair and public hearing” to one 
charged with an offense.  This protection is sometimes placed in §11(d)); see R. v. 
Corbett, [1988] 64 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), (and sometimes in §7); see R. v. 
Stinchcombe, [1991] 8 C.R. (4th) 277, 285 (S.C.C.) (Government has broad 
constitutional duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence, as right to 
make full answer and defence is “one of the pillars of criminal justice on which we 
depend to ensure that the innocent are not convicted.”);  Thompson Newspapers Ltd., 
[(1990] 76 C.R. (3d) 129, 238 (S.C.C.) (La Forest, J.). (The explicit overlap has been 
recognized: anything protected by the right to a fair hearing would “in any event be 
protected under s. 7 as an aspect of the principles of fundamental justice.”); See also 
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, 603 (holding provisions of rape shield statute 
that absolutely precluded introduction of complainant’s prior sexual conduct, even to 
explain alternative source of injuries, deprived defendant of liberty without 
fundamental justice because they contradicted fundamental principle that innocent 
person not be convicted).
13
one, or the other, or both apply, and which trumps the other – that
ultimately defines both the judicial role and the effective meaning of 
the protection.
II. Two Models for the Relationship between the Basic 
Guarantee and Enumerated Rights
When these protections overlap in any particular case, the 
relationship between them can follow either of two very different 
analytic models.  In one model, the basic guarantee has a limited role, 
in which it is principally a “gap-filler” for issues not addressed by the 
enumerated rights, or a back-stop for egregious cases.  In the other 
model, the basic guarantee has an expansive role, infusing all the 
enumerated rights and possessing the ability to supersede them, 
providing protections even when the applicable enumerated rights 
would afford none.    
A. The Limited Model of the Basic Guarantee of 
Adjudicative Fairness
The basic guarantee can be understood as “fundamental” in the 
sense that it is an essential prerequisite for any constitutional process.  
The sections which follow s. 7, like the right to a fair trial enshrined in s. 
11(d), reflect particular principles of fundamental justice:  Re B.C. Motor 
Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.  Thus the discussion of s. 7 and s. 11(d) 
is inextricably intertwined.
In the United States, confessions jurisprudence is one example of these 
overlapping protections.  Confessions that are the product of custodial interrogation 
must be preceded by warnings that the suspect may remain silent, consult counsel, at 
government expense if the suspect cannot afford counsel, and that statements given 
will be used against him, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Interrogations that follow 
these warnings and a valid waiver of the rights they afford, however, still may not 
involve police coercion such that it overbears the will of the suspect.  Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (“certain interrogation techniques, either in 
isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so 
offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.”).  Non-
violation of the enumerated right, in short, does not necessarily make the confession 
valid; it may still be obtained in violation of the basic guarantee.
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Thus a criminal defendant may always claim that the process they 
received violated the basic guarantee, but with respect to any 
applicable enumerated rights, their claim will fail so long as they 
received whatever process the enumerated right afforded.   
“Fundamental,” understood in this sense, carries with it no greater test 
than that the defendant received whatever the applicable enumerated 
rights guaranteed.  The basic guarantee may invalidate a process when 
no enumerated rights apply,32 or in particularly egregious cases,33 but 
these are the exceptions.34  This is the “limited” model of the basic 
32See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 486 (1978) (For example, the 
generalized guarantee may provide a right to a specific remedy where no enumerated 
right is implicated.  Presumption of innocence, though not enumerated as a specific 
right in the constitution, is a basic requirement of due process in a criminal trial, and 
jury must be so instructed.  Pre-indictment identification cases, or identification 
practices in which the right to counsel does not apply such as photographic 
identifications, are other examples of this overlap in which the basic guarantee can 
fill in for inapplicable enumerated rights.);  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) 
(holding unnecessarily suggestive pretrial photo identification which does not violate 
right to counsel, because it occurred prior to indictment, might nevertheless violate 
due process if it created a very substantial likelihood of misidentification); See also 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (holding preindictment delay does not 
violate Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, but could violate due process if delay 
caused substantial prejudice to defendant).
33The pre-incorporation cases involving the rights to counsel and invalidating 
coerced confessions are examples of this.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932) (due process requires capital defendant be given opportunity to obtain counsel 
and appointment of counsel, even though right to appointed counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment had not been identified or incorporated, because this was “a capital 
case, where defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of 
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the 
like”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (complex of values in due process 
precludes use of defendant’s statements extracted through beating); Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960) (statement obtained after police fooled defendant 
into thinking they were forcing his sick wife to come in for questioning violated due 
process even though it might have been reliable).
34See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (“Beyond the specific 
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited 
operation.  We, therefore, have defined the category of infractions that violate 
‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.”); See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157 (1986) (noting even statements that were not product of defendant’s free choice 
admissible so long as police not involved, and that statements of questionable 
reliability nevertheless admissible as “this is a matter to be governed by the 
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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guarantee.35
In the United States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that the right to counsel in a criminal case (enumerated in the 
Sixth Amendment) exists because counsel is an attribute of a criminal 
process that is fair -- a right protected by the basic guarantee.36
35The Court has noted this most clearly in Medina v. California:
[There are] many of our criminal due process cases, in which we have 
required States to institute procedures that were neither required at common 
law nor explicitly commanded by the text of the Constitution.   See, e.g., 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due process right to trial transcript 
on appeal);  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process right to 
discovery of exculpatory evidence);  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 
(1966) (due process right to protection from prejudicial publicity and 
courtroom disruptions);  Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (due 
process right to introduce certain evidence);  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778 (1973) (due process right to hearing and counsel before probation 
revoked);  Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)(due process right to 
psychiatric examination when sanity is significantly in question).
505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
36
“In a long line of cases . . . . this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a 
fair trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).  As does the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Strickland, the Supreme Court of Canada finds that “the right to 
effective assistance of counsel . . . is seen as a principle of fundamental justice. . . 
derived from the evolution of the common law, s. 650(3) of the Criminal Code of  
Canada and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” B. 
(G.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520, 530-531.
The Supreme Court of Canada cited Strickland in adopting a standard that 
an ineffectiveness claim required both assistance that fell below the standard of 
reasonable professional assistance and a resulting miscarriage of justice.  This 
appears at first glance identical to the standard in Strickland that a defendant must 
prove that the representation both fell below the standard of reasonable professional 
assistance and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the 
outcome would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694.  Note, however, that the 
Canadian Supreme Court explains that “[m]iscarriages of justice may take many 
forms in this context.  In some instances, counsel's performance may have resulted in 
procedural unfairness. In others, the reliability of the trial's result may have been 
compromised.”  B. (G.D.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. at 532.  Thus, deficient performance of 
counsel and procedural unfairness alone may be sufficient to make out a violation of 
the right to counsel in Canada.  DON STUART, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN 
CRIMINAL LAW 175, note 815 (“This ‘or’ seems to allow for remedies where there 
was no prejudice.”) 
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However, in situations in which the enumerated right to counsel is 
applicable, the basic guarantee has little significance – because the 
constitution “defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through 
the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel 
Clause.”37  Whether the right to counsel applies in a given situation 
controls the scope of the right, and can naturally affect its meaning.  
Thus the Court has had to interpret what is a “criminal prosecution,”38
and what constitutes “counsel.”  It is only, however, when the 
enumerated right does not apply (i.e., when the Sixth Amendment has 
been held not to require counsel, such as before or after the criminal 
prosecution itself), that the basic guarantee becomes significant.39  The 
basic guarantee then fills the gap for establishing a minimum standard 
of fairness required in order to satisfy the constitution.40
B. The Expansive Model of the Basic Guarantee of 
Adjudicative Fairness
The basic guarantee can also be understood as “fundamental” 
in the sense that it is overarching or the most important of all 
constitutional requirements.  In this sense, even if the applicable 
enumerated rights have been satisfied, there may still be a violation of 
the basic guarantee.  This is the interpretation that the Supreme Court 
37Id.
38The Court has identified only proceedings that result in a deprivation of liberty as 
ones to which the Sixth Amendment can apply.  
39For cases “before” the prosecution, See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 
(1971) (Sixth amendment’s speedy trial right does not apply prior to indictment, but 
due process can limit preindictment delay);   For cases “after” the prosecution, See
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (due process requires counsel in first level 
appeals as of right); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (due process may 
require counsel in parole and probation revocation hearings); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U.S. 600 (1974) (due process does not require counsel for defendant seeking 
discretionary review). 
40See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Sixth amendment right to counsel 
applied only to critical stages of criminal prosecutions); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600 (1974) (due process does not require provision of counsel for discretionary 
appellate review of a criminal conviction, because grant of discretionary appellate
review is based upon factors unrelated to correct adjudication of guilt); Pennsylvania 
v. Finely, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (due process does not require provision of counsel for 
defendant’s state post-conviction collateral challenge).
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of Canada has given the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ basic 
guarantee of fundamental justice.41
In Canada, for example, the enumerated rights that protect an 
accused person from being compelled to incriminate themselves apply 
only to testimonial compulsion.42  Thus they were inapplicable when 
an arrestee was questioned by a police officer posing as another 
inmate.43  However, the principle of fundamental justice was held to 
embrace a right to silence on the part of the defendant, “as an integral 
element of our accusatorial and adversarial system of criminal 
justice.”44  The Court finds that there must be a right to silence, 
because of the wide range of other existing procedural guarantees that 
must be premised upon it, including pre-Charter cases, and its common 
law recognition, but since this “right” clearly applies only to 
testimonial compulsion, then the “right” to silence implicated by the 
practice at issue must be a right to silence protected as a principle of 
fundamental justice.45
In considering a fundamental justice challenge, the Supreme 
Court of Canada follows what it has described as a “purposive” 
approach,46 in which it attempts to carry out the purpose of the Charter 
41R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 163. (“[A] fundamental principle of justice 
under s. 7 may be broader in scope than a particular legal rule, such as the 
confessions rule, is that it must be capable of embracing more than one rule and 
reconciling diverse but related principles.  Thus the right of a detained person to 
silence should be philosophically compatible with related rights, such as the right 
against self-incrimination at trial and the right to counsel.”).  
42Charter, §11(c) (“Any person charged with an offence has the right . . . (c) not to be 
compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the 
offence;”) and §13 (“A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to 
have any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate that witness in any 
other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of 
contradictory evidence.”)
43R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, par. 19.
44Id, par. 20.
45Id.
46Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), 2 S.C.R. 486 (1985).  (The 
Supreme Court of Canada has also followed a “purposive” approach with respect to 
some  enumerated rights.)  See Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 41 C.R.(3d) 97 (S.C.R.), 
(interpreting section 8's guarantee that “Everyone has the right to be secure against 
18
“to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms it enshrines.”47  Under this approach, the 
Court asks whether the practice at issue contradicts a “basic tenet of 
[the] legal system.”48  If it does, then the fact that it satisfies existing 
law, or does not violate an enumerated right, does not preclude its
failing as a matter of fundamental justice.49  The basic guarantee thus 
always carries the ability to expand the scope of a protection, even if 
the enumerated rights offer no further protections.  
III. The Relationship between the Protections in Canada and 
the United States
Despite adopting such different models for the relationship 
between the basic guarantee and the enumerated rights, the Supreme 
Courts of Canada and the United States followed a pattern of 
development of the guarantee of basic adjudicative fairness that was 
similar in three respects.50  First, in both cases there was an initial 
period of debate about the guarantee’s meaning.  During this period, 
unreasonable search or seizure,” the Court held that a search of a newspaper by a 
federal officer, appropriately (thought not judicially) authorized by federal statute, 
violated section 8.  The Court held that section 8 implicitly required some minimum 
standard of prior judicial authorization, based upon objective grounds that had been 
established by oath.);  See STUART, CHARTER PRINCIPLES, at 5, op cited at note ___. 
47Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 41 C.R.(3d) 97, 156 (S.C.R.).
48Id.
49R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 163-64. (“The final reason why a principle of 
fundamental justice under s. 7 may be broader than a particular rule exemplifying it 
lies in considerations relating to the philosophy of the Charter and the purpose of the 
fundamental right in question in that context.  The Charter has fundamentally 
changed our legal landscape.  A legal rule relevant to a fundamental right may be too 
narrow to be reconciled with the philosophy and approach of the Charter and the 
purpose of the Charter guarantee.”); See § V.A., infra. (It is also possible that the 
restriction on a right which violates fundamental justice might be “saved” under the 
savings provision of §1.)  
50The length of this development was quite different in the two countries.  In the 
United States, it dates roughly from 1884, with the Court’s decision in Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, to its development of selective incorporation in the 1960's.  
In Canada, much of what took seventy-five or eighty years in the United States 
appears to have occurred in less than two decades.
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each Court addressed preliminary issues concerning the scope of the 
guarantee and its relationship to specific rights.  For example, each 
court addressed whether the basic guarantee enabled it to engage in 
substantive, rather than only procedural, review of legislation.51  Each 
court also addressed whether the existence of a specific right, already 
entrenched in the constitution, superceded any effect of the general 
guarantee in the area covered by the specific right, and both courts 
held that it did not.52  In Canada, this initial period of debate 
51With respect to substantive review under the Charter, compare Latham v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), 39 C.R. (3d) 78 (Fed. T.D. 1984) (rejecting view that § 7 
required substantive review) with B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, 48 C.R. (3d) 289 
(S.C.C. 1985) (holding § 7 required both procedural and substantive review, and 
rejecting such a distinction).  The Canadian debate erupted in the scholarly literature 
almost immediately.  See L. Tremblay, Section 7 of the Charter: Substantive Due 
Process?, 18 U.B.C. L. REV. 201 (1984); P.J. Monahan  & A. Petter, Developments 
in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term, 9 SUP. CT. L. REV. 69 (1987); R.A. 
MacDonald, Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Law 
and Fundamental Justice, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 217 (1987); B. Chapman, Criminal 
Law Liability and Fundamental Justice: Toward a Theory of Substantive Judicial 
Review, 44 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 153 (1986).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s earliest 
holding that due process had some independent meaning beyond simply following 
the rules was clear after Hurtado, id., described as the case “that made judges [via the 
due process clause] censors over what was ‘fundamental’ in a judicial procedure.”  
David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 1789-1888, at 368 (1985), cited in Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due 
Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive 
Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 303, 346 (2001).
52For Canada, See R. v. Hebert, [1990] 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.) (pretrial right to 
silence held protected by §7 despite existing protections in § 11(c) against compelled 
testimony by accused and § 13 against incrimination of witness with evidence form 
another proceeding).  For the United States, the Supreme Court had suggested in 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) that due process might not overlap with 
specific protections in enumerated rights, but this “suggestion was short-lived, 
however, and the Court eventually found within the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process various rights also protected by specific Bill of Rights guarantees.”  §2.4 
LAFAVE, ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 56 (3d ed. 2000).  The Court readily 
extended due process protection to prohibit practices in the judicial process that did 
not obviously conflict with any specific enumerated right.  See Moore v. Dempsey, 
261 U.S. 86 (1923), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (compensation for trial 
judge only when criminal defendants are convicted violates due process).  For a 
comparatively recent example of this, See  Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 486 
(1978) (presumption of innocence, though not enumerated as a specific right in the 
constitution, is a basic requirement of due process in a criminal trial, and jury must 
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concerning the substantive reach of the guarantee lasted only a few 
years,53 while in the U.S. it lasted several decades.54
Second, after this initial period of debate, both courts used the 
basic guarantee to implement specific rights in the criminal justice 
system.  In Canada, this involved the implementation of textually 
“entrenched”55 rights,56 while in the U.S. this involved first the judicial 
entrenchment of rights (i.e., their incorporation and thus guarantee of 
permanent applicability to the states) and then their implementation.  
After judicial entrenchment of a right in the U.S., the significance of 
the basic guarantee was then reduced to those situations that fell 
between existing enumerated rights.57  While the mechanics differed 
somewhat given the different degree to which specific rights were 
entrenched, both Courts used the broad guarantee of basic adjudicative 
fairness to substantively change an entire area of law - notwithstanding 
that the area arguably had already been largely codified though 
enumeration of specific rights.58
be so instructed).
53B.C. Motor Vehicle reference, settled the matter in Canada within three years of the 
Charter’s adoption.  In the United States, See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 
(1884).  
54Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 120 (1884). (Made this clear, as it involved 
determining whether the right to a grand jury indictment  –  protected in federal cases 
by the fifth amendment  –  existed in state cases.  The Court found that the existence 
of the right to an indictment in the same amendment as the right guaranteeing due 
process must have meant that due process did not necessarily require a grand jury 
indictment  – “lest why else include the guarantee of an indictment when due process 
was already ensured?”). 
55Supra note ___ (defining use of “entrenchment”).
56The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched by the Constitution 
Act (enacted by the Canada Act of 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, Sched. B) on April 17, 1982.
57See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment) (noting instances Court has required procedures that were neither required 
at common law nor explicitly commanded by the text of the Constitution, such as 
right to trial transcript on appeal, discovery of exculpatory evidence, protection from 
prejudicial publicity and courtroom disruptions, right to introduce certain evidence, 
right to hearing and counsel before probation revoked, and right to psychiatric 
examination when sanity is significantly in question).
58Alan W. Mewett & Shaun Nakatsuru, 21 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL 
PROCESS IN CANADA (4th ed.2000). (“[I]t is clear that section 7 has enormous 
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Third, despite considerable initial concerns by the political 
branches in both countries that the basic guarantee of adjudicative 
fairness would be used to change social or economic policy, this has 
not been the most significant impact of the use of the guarantee in 
either country.59  Instead, in both countries it is the criminal justice 
system that has been the subject of the most significant reform efforts 
through use of the broad guarantee.60
potential in enabling the courts to control not only the substance of criminal 
legislation but also many aspects of investigation and procedure beyond those 
specifically set out in the Charter.”).  
59Obviously there were no articulated concerns by the drafters of the American 
constitution that the Supreme Court would use due process to effect substantive 
control of policy, as there was then even no established principle of judicial review.  
But See, The Federalist, No. 78, (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts. . . .   If there should happen to be an irreconcilable 
variance between [the constitution and a legislative enactment], that which has the 
superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, 
the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the 
intention of their agents.”); Clinton Rossiter, ed. (1961), 467.  There was, however, 
significant political reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of substantive due 
process to control economic policy in the start of the New Deal era.  See, e.g., Daniel 
Farber, Who Killed Lecher, 90 GEO. L. J. 985 (2001) (reviewing WILLIAM  E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995)).
Sujit Choudhry, The Lecher Era and Comparative Constitutionalism 31-36, 
Univ. of Toronto Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 02-22, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=363220,. (With respect to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s substantive use of fundamental justice in connection with economic 
matters, analyzing both the Charter framers’ fear that the Court would use the 
Charter to undertake substantive review of legislative policy choices (which it did), 
and that it would extend the reach of this review to regulation of economic activity as 
a form of “liberty” (which it did not)); See also Irwin Toy v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
927, para. 95 (holding only natural persons, not corporations, are entitled to sec. 7's 
protection of fundamental justice for deprivation of “liberty,” and that economic 
“liberty” implicit in non-penal regulation was not meant to be guaranteed by sec. 7, 
but that economic aspects of “security of the person” might be reached by the 
guarantee).
60There are of course exceptions to this generalization.  In the U.S., the political 
branches responded to the Court’s use of the broad guarantee as a means of 
resistance to economic reform during the New Deal (through the early incarnation of 
substantive due process) with the Court-packing plan.  In both countries, abortion is 
an area of social policy that the Court has addressed through the use of the broad 
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Given the respective differences in constitutional and federal 
structures, as well as the different historical contexts in which they 
took place, these processes naturally happened differently in the two 
countries.61  In the United States, where the Supreme Court had 
recently undergone a basic challenge from the executive (Roosevelt’s 
court packing plan) to its use of a substantive guarantee to measure the 
wisdom of policy (substantive due process), and where a federal 
structure gave primary authority over criminal matters to subnational 
jurisdictions (the states), the Court used the guarantee of basic 
adjudicative fairness as a substitute for specific rights that had not 
been entrenched.  The only “entrenched” rights at the time had not yet 
been applied to the states or incorporated, thus they were only 
entrenched for the comparatively small number of criminal cases in 
federal court.  In the United States, the guarantee of basic adjudicative 
fairness was a substitute for rights that had not been textually 
entrenched.62  The guarantee was so broad and essentially ill-defined 
guarantee.  In both countries, it has been judicially protected as a matter of the 
substantive version of the basic adjudicative guarantee.  In the U.S., Roe v. Wade is 
generally seen as a decision implementing substantive due process, albeit under the 
rubric of “privacy.”  In Canada, Morgentaler is a decision involving substantive 
limits under fundamental justice.  Both cases, though, do involve criminal statutes. 
61The limits to comparative assessments inherent in the differing structures of the 
two countries’ constitutions, particularly the Canadian internal checks of secs. 1 and 
33, have been noted by Canadian jurists.
Canada and the United States are not alike in every way, nor have the 
documents entrenching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same 
context.  It is only common sense to recognize that, just as similarities will 
justify borrowing from the American experience, differences may require 
that Canada’s constitutional vision depart from that endorsed in the United 
States.
R. v. Keegstra, 1[1990]  C.R. (4th) 129, 166 (S.C.C.) (Dickson, Ch. J.) (Canadian 
constitution’s concern for equality and multiculturalism, and international 
commitments to eliminate hate propaganda, make limits on such speech 
constitutional in Canada where they would not be in the U.S.).
62The U.S. Supreme Court did implement these rights in a very narrow context that 
ostensibly avoided the interpretive tensions noted above when it invalidated certain 
practices under its “supervisory authority over the administration of justice in the 
federal courts.”  In a small number of cases that involve the mechanics of federal 
trial court procedures, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it can apply what 
appears to be a broad, but non-constitutional, guarantee of adjudicative fairness.  See, 
e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (six hour delay in taking 
suspects before federal magistrate violated federal statutory requirement that arrestee 
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that it could be used to remedy a wide variety of deficiencies in the 
procedural fairness of state criminal proceedings.63  Its very breadth 
and malleability, however, was its ultimate undoing, and the Court 
finally adopted a method of judicial entrenchment of specific rights 
through “selective incorporation” for the reform of the nation’s 
criminal justice system.64
In Canada, the Court was given the authority to enforce a 
package of textually entrenched rights along with a basic guarantee of 
adjudicative fairness.65  This was done with very significant concern 
that the Court would use this to effect just the type of substantive 
review of legislative policy (and explicitly legislative policy about 
economic and social regulation) that led to Roosevelt’s court-packing 
plan in the United States.66  Notwithstanding this concern, the Court 
promptly took the guarantee of basic adjudicative fairness and used it 
to measure the constitutionality, through substantive review, of a wide 
be promptly brought to the nearest judicial officer, and required exclusion of 
resulting confessions lest they “stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into 
law”).  These supervisory authority rulings have extended to procedural standards in 
contempt proceedings , procedures for jury selection, rules concerning discovery and 
disclosure and rules concerning the permissible scope of cross examination.  The 
Court has more recently curtailed its use of its supervisory authority, at least where 
there is no applicable federal statute, and its exercise is sought in order to enforce a 
judicial rule of procedure.   See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) 
(rejecting dismissal of indictment for prosecutor’s failure to present substantial 
exculpatory information to the grand jury, as matter either of supervisory authority of 
lower federal courts or “common law” of the Fifth amendment’s right to independent 
grand jury). 
63See Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The 
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 303, 
346 (2001) (“Hurtado often is described as the launching pad for the flexible, 
evolving conception of due process that later came to dominate the application of 
due process in both its procedural and substantive context.” )  
64Id. at 383.  (This criticism is much like that leveled currently at the Supreme Court 
of Canada from some commentators.); See K. Michael Stephens, Fidelity to 
Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 13 NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 183, 218 (2002);  
Choudhry, supra note __. 
65See CHARTER, §§ 7 (basic guarantee) and 8-14 (enumerated legal rights).
66See § III.A., infra.
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variety of criminal laws and procedures.67
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of 
Canada had explicit tools for reforming the criminal justice system in 
the textually entrenched specific rights already applicable to all 
criminal proceedings (i.e., applicable without the need for any sort of 
“incorporation”).  The significance of this authority for reform is even 
greater in Canada than in the U.S., as criminal matters (including the 
definition of crimes and their prosecution) are virtually all subject to 
national rather than provincial control.68  Even though these procedural 
rights were already explicitly entrenched in the constitution, the Court 
has aggressively used the guarantee of basic adjudicative fairness to 
further expand these procedural rights. 
Although there has been considerable critical discussion about 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s readiness to evaluate the wisdom of 
matters of “policy,” there has been relatively little criticism of its use 
of the broad procedural guarantee to refashion rules of substantive 
criminal law (both legislative and common law) and criminal 
procedure.  The Supreme Court of Canada has in essence held that the 
enumerated rights are non-exclusive illustrations of the potentially 
67Id (cases court has used f/j to refashion crim justice system).
68Substantive criminal law in Canada is Federal Law, according to the Constitution 
Act, 1867.  §91(27) gives the Federal Legislature power to make laws in relation to: 
“The criminal law, except the constitution of courts of criminal jurisdiction, but 
including the procedure in criminal matters.”  This has been done fairly recently.  “In 
Canada, since 1982, the criminal law has been codified in one federally-enacted 
Criminal Code.”  HOGG, supra note 11 at 398;  See also, Criminal Code of Canada 
9[8]. “Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act, no person shall be 
convicted . . . a) of an offence at common law, b) of an offence under an Act of the 
Parliament of England, or of Great Britain, or of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, or c) of an offence under an Act or ordinance in force in any 
province, territory or place before that province, territory or place became a province 
of Canada. . . .”
Although federally-created, the criminal law is enforced and prosecuted by 
the provinces, and judged by provincial judges in provincial courts.  See Constitution 
Act, 1867.  91(14).  The rules of criminal procedure and evidence used in these 
courts, however, are federal, pursuant to 91(27).  While substantive federal American 
criminal law exists, American criminal law is both substantively and procedurally 
overwhelmingly state law.
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infinite number of ways in which the basic guarantee might be 
violated.  In American terms, it would be as if the United States 
Supreme Court had started with the procedural rights that it struggled 
for decades to decide to incorporate already incorporated, and then 
proceeded to use the “independent potency” of the due process clause 
to further measure what these rights meant. 
A. The Genesis and Development of Canadian 
“Fundamental Justice”
At its inception, the Canadian overarching guarantee of 
“fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms was drafted with a wary eye toward the American 
experience with “due process.”69  In 1982, fearful of judicial 
“activism,” and grounded in the English constitutional tradition of 
parliamentary supremacy, the framers of Canada’s modern constitution 
sought to enact a package of individual rights – including a right to 
over-arching fairness in adjudication – that would protect individual 
liberties dramatically better than had Canada’s old “Bill of Rights,” yet 
that would not establish a Supreme Court unequivocally superior to the 
legislature.70
69See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 746-748 (2d ed. 1985).  
See also John D. Whyte, Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 
7 of the Charter, 13 MAN. L. J. 455, 456-59 (1983)(detailing testimony of Federal 
Department of Justice lawyers and questions by members of Parliament).
How on earth do Lecher and natural justice bear on the meaning of 
the term “principles of fundamental justice” in s. 7?  Both were part of the 
stock of common knowledge of the lawyers who participated in drafting s. 
7, and of the lawyers and judges who sought to interpret it.  It is reasonably 
apparent the drafters felt an acute need to avoid the dangers represented by 
Lecher.”  They tended to assume, often expressly, that ‘fundamental justice’ 
meant only procedures, the only alternative was ‘substantive review’ and 
Lecher.  P. MACKLEM, ET AL, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 (2d 
ed. 1997).
70
 Frederick Vaughn, Judicial Politics in Canada: Patterns and Trends, 5 CHOICES 
1, 11-12 (no. 1, June 1999), (IRPP), available at, http://www.irpp.org  (last visited 
September 3, 2003). (“There can be no mistake about it, the new Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms was a considerably more powerful instrument than the old Bill of 
Rights, for the Charter was constitutionally entrenched, becoming a formal part of 
‘the fundamental law of the land,’ and gave judges the power to declare offending 
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The Charter, unlike Canada’s Bill of Rights, explicitly placed 
certain guarantees in the text of the constitution, and authorized their 
judicial protection against encroachment by the provincial, as well as 
the national, governments.71  One part of this package of protections 
for the individual was a set of “legal rights,”72 deprivations of which 
were permissible, under section 7, only in accordance with the 
principles of “fundamental justice.”  
Section 7 provides: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”  One of 
eighteen “legal rights” in the Charter,73 section 7 has been described as 
acts and procedures ‘unconstitutional’.”).  
71Section 52(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: “The Constitution of 
Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the 
provision of the Constitution is, to the extent of this inconsistency, of no force or 
effect.”  CAN. CONST.  (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §52(1).   Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that “anyone whose 
rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may 
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Id. §24(1).  The Canadian 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Charter to have expanded its authority of judicial 
review.  See Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Ass’n. of Protestant School 
Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 68.  
72The “legal rights” include protections against unreasonable search or seizures, See 
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms),§ 8; against arbitrary detention or imprisonment, See id. at § 9; to notice 
of the reasons for arrest, the right to counsel and judicial determination of the 
validity of detention , See id. at §10; to notice of the offense, trial within a reasonable 
time, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to be presumed innocent, to 
not be denied reasonable bail without just cause, to a jury trial in serious cases, to 
protection against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy, See id. at §11; not to be 
subjected to cruel and unusual treatment and punishment, See id. at §12; not to have 
one’s testimony used to incriminate oneself in another proceeding, See id. at §13; 
and to an interpreter, See id. at § 14.
73In addition to “legal rights,” the Charter also guarantees “fundamental freedoms” 
(which are comparable to those guaranteed in the 1st Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution), id. § 2(a-d), “democratic rights,” (voting rights and limits to the 
continuation of a Parliament), id. §§ 3-5, “mobility rights,” (rights to travel and 
pursue employment throughout the country), and “equality rights” (comparable to 
equal protection, but with much broader classifications).
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“the most elegant but mysterious provision”74 of the Charter.  The 
drafters of the Charter feared, however, that section 7, ostensibly a 
declaration of the right to basic procedural fairness, would instead 
place too much authority in the hands of judges, and could create 
substantive judicial review of the wisdom of all legislation, akin to the 
substantive due process jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
epitomized by the “totemic”75 Lecher v. New York.76  Skeptical 
legislators feared that the breadth of its language would enable the 
Canadian Supreme Court to implement substantive review of the 
policy choices in legislation under the guise of reviewing legislation’s 
constitutionality.77  As the Canadian Supreme Court explained in the 
“bold and striking reasons for judgment”78 in an early opportunity to 
analyze section 7:
[T]here has prevailed in certain quarters an assumption 
that all but a narrow construction of s. 7 will inexorably 
lead the courts to ‘question the wisdom of enactments,’ 
to adjudicate upon the merits of public policy.  From 
this have sprung warnings of the dangers of a judicial 
‘super-legislature’ beyond the reach of Parliament, the 
provincial legislatures and the electorate.79
74E. Colvin, Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 68
CAN. BAR. REV. 560, 560 (1989).
75
 John D. Whyte, Fundamental Justice: The Scope and Application of Section 7 of 
the Charter, 13 MAN. L. J. 455, 457 (1983)(“[G]overnment lawyers brought forth 
Lecher v. New York to perform its totemic task; the mere mention of the name of the 
case, which invalidated maximum hours of labour legislation, drove all decent 
democrats scurrying for language that raised no possibility of substantive review”).
76198 U.S. 45 (1905).
77See Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) [1985], 2 S.C.R. 486,
504-505 (quoting testimony of Department of Justice Federal Civil Servants before 
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the 
Constitution of Canada, that fundamental justice was not meant to include both the 
procedural and substantive components of American due process but only procedural 
due process or, in terms of Canadian administrative law, “natural justice”). 
78DAVID C. MCDONALD, LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS 143 (1989).
79See Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.) [1985], 2 S.C.R. 486, 
497.
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It is no coincidence that section 7 is similar to the guarantees in 
the U.S. Constitution, that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law,”80 although of course it does 
not protect property.81   Despite this similarity, the Canadian 
legislature took pains to distinguish section 7 in at least one other very 
important way.  As Professor Hogg has observed, “[t]he legislative 
history clearly discloses an intention on the part of the framers to avoid 
substantive judicial review.”82  “It is plain,” Hogg has noted, “from the 
testimony before the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution that 
the reason why the phrase ‘due process’ was not used in section 7 was 
to make clear that the American cases applying the concept of 
‘substantive due process’ were not to be followed in Canada.”83
Despite these early concerns, section 7 has not, in fact, had a 
significant impact on either economic84 or social regulation at all.85  Its 
80U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV.
81The Canadian guarantee, unlike the United States’ provision, includes protection 
for security of the person.  Unlike the U.S. guarantee, it does not protect “property.”  
The significance of these differences, in particular the absence of the property 
protection  in the Charter, was made clear in Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
927, para. 95, supra note ___.
82HOGG, supra note __at 747.
83HOGG, supra note __at 748.
84See Choudhry, op cit. note ___, at 36, noting “clear, albeit infrequent, signals from 
the Supreme Court rejecting a constitutionalized economic libertarianism.”
85The obvious exception to this point is arguably abortion.  In Morgentaler, Smoling 
and Scott v. The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, four members of the Court concluded 
that national legislation imposing criminal penalties for doctors who performed 
abortions and women who sought them - unless a hospital therapeutic review 
committee had determined that continuing the pregnancy would endanger the life or 
health of the woman - violated section 7.  Their opinions found that the law 
impermissibly infringed the security of the person (not liberty) by delaying a 
woman’s ability to obtain safe and effective medical treatment, and by offering both 
the woman and the doctor at best an illusory defense through the sanction of ill-
defined, standardless and often non-functioning “therapeutic review committees.”;  
See 1. S.C.R. at ___ (Opinion of Dickson, C.J.), and 1 S.C.R. at ___ (Opinion of 
Beetz, J.).  (These opinions also both held that the law did not satisfy the “savings 
clause” of section 1.  Both took pains to explain, however, that their decision was not 
about the lawfulness or desirability of abortion per se, and did not take any position 
on the existence of a right to “privacy,” “liberty,” or “abortion.”);  See id at ___.  (As 
such, these opinions arguably are narrow judgments concerning the scope of a 
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real bite as a guarantee of the rights of individuals has been in the area 
of criminal law and procedure.  It has become, according to one 
commentator, “the most powerful vehicle for the establishment of new 
protections for the accused in the criminal law.”86  As one 
commentator has explained:
[T]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in the hands 
of the Supreme Court, has been a powerful instrument of 
criminal law reform.  While there are those who might doubt 
that the reform has been “radical,” it is hard to deny that the 
Charter has had a significant impact in the areas of substantive 
criminal law, criminal procedure, and criminal evidence.87
criminal sanction and its terms (here its defense)). 
From another perspective, these opinions are either an effort to reach the 
right to abortion, or a futile attempt to avoid doing so, under the guise of measuring a 
criminal statute.  See 1 S.C.R. at ___ (Opinion of McIntyre, dissenting) (citing 
Holmes’  opposition to the use of substantive due process in issues of minimum 
wage, etc.), and 1 S.C.R. at ___ (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (holding determination of 
right to abortion essential to evaluating whether the law violates section 7).  Both of 
these positions have in turn been criticized, the former for its shoddy use of history, 
the later for its too casual acceptance of the American model of “privacy,” without 
recognizing either its precarious jurisprudential position or the controversy 
concerning it.   Lorraine Eisenstat Weinreb, The Morgentaler Judgment: 
Constitutional Rights, Legislative Intention and Institutional Design, 12 U. TORONTO 
LAW J. 1, 50 (1992).
86DON STUART, 47 CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 2001).
87Dennis Klinck, The Charter and Substantive Criminal “Justice,” 42 U. N.B. L. J.
191 (1993).  See also, ROBERT J. SHARPE & KATHERINE E. SWINTON, THE CHARTER 
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS CH. 14 (1998) (“The Charter of Rights and Freedoms has 
had a profound impact in the area of criminal law.”) c.f., Robert Harvey & Hamar 
Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court of Canada, 
American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law Under the 
Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 92 (1992) (“It seems beyond debate that the most 
striking result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Charter jurisprudence has been its 
willingness to create a constitutional doctrine of mens rea.”).
Some scholars suggested quite early that the differences between American 
and Canadian forms of federalism, and particularly the national authority over 
criminal in Canada, would preclude the necessity of raising criminal law questions 
into constitutional ones.  See Martin L. Friedland, Criminal Justice and the Charter, 
13 MAN. L. J. 549, 551 (1983) (“[I]n Canada [maintenance of criminal law rules] can 
be done directly [through ordinary rules of law] because the criminal law is a federal 
30
Since 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has embarked on an 
ambitious program of both substantive and procedural reform of the 
criminal justice system.88  As comparative scholars have noted, 
whatever one’s opinion about the appropriateness of a court’s 
constitutional review of substantive criminal law, it is undeniable that 
such a review has happened in Canada.  As Professors Harvey and 
Foster have noted, “it seems important to emphasize that the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision to do so [i.e., undertake constitutional 
review of substantive criminal law] was exactly that: a decision.”89
A quick catalogue of the significance of two decades of 
fundamental justice review for the Canadian criminal justice system 
illustrates its dramatic impact on the substantive criminal law through 
the demise of the felony-murder (or “constructive murder”) rule90 and 
the imposition of a minimal requirement of some degree of mens rea –
even negligence – for so called “regulatory offenses.”91 Noteworthy 
decisions include permitting a defendant to introduce evidence of 
intoxication as a defense even in general intent offenses,92 and 
responsibility.”).  See also, PETER W. HOGG, CANADA ACT 1982 ANNOTATED 28
(1982); T. J. Christan, Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Constraints 
on State Action, 22 ALBERTA L. REV. 222, 229 (1984).
88
 Frederick Vaughn, Judicial Politics in Canada: Patterns and Trends, 5 CHOICES 1, 
17 (no. 1, June 1999), (IRPP), available at, http://www.irpp.org (last visited August 
31, 2000). (“In many respects, the Charter has provided judges at all levels of the 
Canadian judiciary with a new set of tools with which to make a difference in 
criminal matters, even to prompt major changes in criminal procedure.  But no level 
of the judiciary has responded to this new challenge more enthusiastically than the 
Supreme Court of Canada, especially in the early years.”).  
89Robert Harvey & Hamar Foster, Different Drummers, Different Drums: The 
Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of 
Criminal Law Under the Charter, 24 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 95 (1992).
90R. v. Vaillancourt, 2 S.C.R. 636, 47 D.L.R. (4th) 399 (1987) (holding absent proof 
of moral blameworthiness, a person cannot be convicted of murder; fundamental 
justice requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the objective foreseeability that 
one’s conduct could cause death); See also, R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
91R. v. Wholesale Travel Group, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (holding 
fundamental justice requires some degree of fault in order to punish, even for 
“regulatory offenses,” but this is satisfied by negligence - even where a violation 
carries the possibility of imprisonment).
92R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (permitting evidence of voluntary intoxication in 
general intent offenses only when intoxication was sufficient to preclude defendant’s 
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invalidating rules that had limited a defendant’s ability to introduce 
evidence of intoxication to rebut proof that he possessed the required 
mental state for a crime.93  In the area of criminal procedure, they 
include decisions recognizing that, as a proposition of fundamental 
justice, criminal defendants have a right to discovery of the 
prosecution’s case (and of anything that might assist the defense),94
and a right to be advised of their right to counsel before potentially 
incriminating evidence (breathalyzer samples) is obtained from them.95
They also include decisions that fundamental justice protects an 
incarcerated defendant’s right to remain silent (after invocation of this 
right) when questioned either by police officers posing as inmates96 or 
by inmates acting as agents of the police.97  Other procedural holdings 
of note include decisions that fundamental justice is violated by 
automatic commitment of insanity acquitees without a separate 
hearing,98 by the prosecution’s raising of the insanity defense against 
the defendant’s objection,99 and by a presumption that a criminal 
defendant was sane – although the last provision was “saved” by 
section 1.100
Fundamental justice, in short, has had a profound effect on the 
Canadian criminal justice system.  This is not the specific effect that 
the framers of the Charter feared fundamental justice would cause, but 
a look south, and into the history of constitutional jurisprudence of due 
process in criminal cases in the United States, might have suggested 
this development.  
forming the requisite mental state).
93R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
94R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
95R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
96R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.
97R v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595.
98R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, 944.
99Id. at 946. 
100R. v. Chaulk,[1990] 3. S.C.R. 1303 (holding presumption of sanity violates section 
7 and 11(d), yet is saved by section 1).
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B. A Very Short History of Fundamental Fairness and 
American Due Process
Before most trial-related rights guaranteed by the U.S. federal 
constitution had been held applicable to the states in criminal 
proceedings, the absence of a guarantee in state criminal justice was 
often challenged as a federal “due process” violation.  These 
challenges arose under one of two theories of “fundamental fairness.”  
First, the absence of a guarantee could be alleged to violate a right 
which was either conceptually “fundamental.”  Under this concept of 
fundamental fairness, the guarantee was necessarily incorporated into 
the state system, because no civilized justice system could be imagined 
without it.  A fundamental guarantee was then “of the very essence of 
a scheme of ordered liberty.”101  A guarantee might also be required by 
fundamental fairness for historical reasons, because it protects against
actions that “offend those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples toward 
those charged with the most heinous offenses.”102  Both of these 
concepts of fundamental fairness were case-specific, and focused on 
determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances in a 
particular case, the proceedings had been fundamentally unfair.103
101Compare, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (holding prohibition on 
double jeopardy not a requirement of due process), with Powell v. Alabama, 87 U.S. 
45 (1932) (holding due process, under fundamental fairness analysis, requires 
criminal defendants to be given opportunity to obtain counsel and appointment of 
counsel in a capital case, even though right to appointed counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment had not been identified or incorporated).  Justice McDonald has 
suggested that the better analogy for §§ 8-14 of the Charter is in fact that they 
represent a non-exhaustive, illustrative list of a “scheme of ordered liberty.”  DAVID 
C. MCDONALD, LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS 106 (1989).
102Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416 (1945).
103See, e.g.,§2.4 LAFAVE, ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 57 (3d ed. 2000).  After the 
abandonment of fundamental fairness in favor of selective incorporation, some 
criticized the new doctrine as lacking this necessary flexibility.  See, e.g.,  Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)  (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“In short, neither history, 
nor sense, supports using the Fourteenth Amendment to put the states in a 
constitutional straitjacket with respect to their own development in the 
administration of criminal or civil law.”) 
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Under a second theory of “fundamental fairness” analysis, a 
state action could be challenged because it violated the “independent 
potency” of the Due Process Clause,104 not because it involved the 
absence or violation of a textual guaranty, but because it was simply 
an action so horrendous as to “shock the conscience.”105  The theory 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had some 
“independent potency” to invalidate a state rule – although presented 
as a very narrowly used power106 - was vigorously criticized as a 
substantive, rather than a procedural judgment, and in the most 
extreme cases no more than the dangerously elastic,107 substantive 
political judgments of the judge rendering the decision. 
The basic guarantee in the United States was used not to give 
meaning to and expand the enumerated rights, as it was in Canada, but 
104See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The [Fourteenth] Amendment neither comprehends the specific provisions 
by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal 
government nor is it confined to them.  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency, precisely as does the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in relation to the federal 
government.  
105Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that  involuntary stomach 
pumping of defendant in order to obtain incriminating evidence constitutes a federal 
due process violation).
106The Court in Rochin stated that:
“[I]n reviewing a State criminal conviction under a claim of right 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from 
which is derived the most far-reaching and most frequent basis of 
challenging State criminal justice, ‘we must be deeply mindful of the 
responsibilities of the States for the enforcement of criminal law, and 
exercise with due humility our merely negative function in subjecting 
convictions from state courts to the very narrow scrutiny which the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes.’” Id. at 168.
107See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69 (Black, J., dissenting) (“This decision reasserts 
a constitutional theory . . . that this Court is endowed by the Constitution with 
boundless power under “natural law” periodically to expand and contract 
constitutional standards to conform to the Court’s conception of that at a particular 
time constitutes “civilized decency’ and ‘fundamental liberty and justice.’”); See 
also, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 177 (Black, J., concurring) (“I long ago concluded that the 
accordion- like qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual 
liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.”).
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simply to entrench them.  Due process was ultimately a determinant or 
a trigger for incorporating a right, by a finding that the right was 
“fundamental.”  After this finding, however, due process was of 
relatively little importance in determining the scope or meaning of the 
right.  It was only in those areas that seemed to fall between enumerate 
rights, or outside of them, that fundamental fairness still had 
significance.   
IV. Incorporation through Fundamental Fairness and the 
Meaning of Fundamental Justice
At first glance, the debate concerning which state criminal 
procedures violated the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of “due 
process,” and whether a particular guarantee has been “incorporated” 
(i.e., applied to the states), would seem irrelevant in Canada,108 as 
Canadian substantive criminal law is exclusively federal,109 and the 
procedural rights applicable in the Canadian criminal process have all 
been “incorporated” through their entrenchment in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.  In both the Canadian and U.S. contexts, 
however, the debate concerned the application of a basic guarantee of 
adjudicative fairness that transcends a specific procedural guarantee.
The debate over the application to the states of specific 
guarantees in the Federal Constitution,110 like the inquiry concerning 
108Canada, like the United States, is a federal, as opposed to a unitary, nation.  See
HOGG, supra note 11 at 92.  (“It is fair to conclude that the unitary elements of the 
Canadian Constitution are quite unimportant in relation to the federal elements, and 
that the Canadian Constitution is federal under any reasonable definition of that 
term.”)
109See note ___ (about 39). 
110The incorporation debate is typically framed in terms of theories of total 
incorporation, fundamental fairness and selective incorporation.
Over the years, essentially three different positions have been advanced 
within the Court on this issue: (1) the total incorporation position, advanced 
in numerous dissents, but never adopted by the Court majority; (2) the 
fundamental fairness position, consistently supported by a majority prior to 
1960; and (3) the selective incorporation doctrine that has prevailed as the 
majority view since the mid-1960s.
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fundamental justice, was a debate about whether there was some 
fundamental substantive requirement of fairness in the adjudication of 
criminal cases beyond that implemented by some or all of the textual 
guarantees, such that even a procedure which satisfied the specific 
textual guarantees could nevertheless violate this requirement.111  The 
American debate between justices Black and Frankfurter concerning 
the meaning of due process was really a debate about whether to adopt 
a limited model of the relationship between the basic guarantee of 
adjudicative fairness and the enumerated rights (as Black sought) or an 
expansive model of this relationship (as Frankfurter sought).  While 
the American debate over “total incorporation” or “fundamental 
fairness” has been effectively mooted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
adoption of “selective incorporation” to apply to the states those 
guarantees found to be “fundamental,”112 the terms of this debate 
§2.2 LAFAVE, ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 51 (3d ed. 2000).
111Compare Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that a 
state constitutional rule that permitted a prosecutor to comment on defendant’s 
failure to testify could violate due process, even though the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination did not apply to states, but did not because such a 
procedure was not fundamentally unfair and did not violate the independent potency
of due process), with Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (holding 
involuntary stomach pumping of defendant did not violate prohibition on 
unreasonable search and seizure or privilege against self-incrimination, as neither 
had been applied to the states, yet was fundamentally unfair so violated due process). 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a fundamental justice challenge 
may be brought under sec. 7 to protect a pretrial right to silence, even where sec. 
11(c) already protect against the accused being compelled to testify and sec. 13 
protect a witness from being incriminated by evidence used in another proceeding.   
R. v. Hebert,  77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.).  While secs. 11(c) and 13might have been 
read to be the extent of the Charter’s reach with respect to protection from 
interrogation, in Hebert the Court went further, and noted that “a fundamental 
principle of justice under s.7 of the Charter may be broader and more general than 
the particular rules which exemplify it.”; Id. at ___; See also Thompson Newspapers, 
[1990] 76 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), and Lyons., [1987] 61 C.R. (3d) 1, 42 (S.C.C.) 
(right to jury.....).
112Among those guarantees selectively incorporated are the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,  see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.  
643 (1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment);  see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1962).  (The various Sixth Amendment guarantees are incorporated; assistance 
of counsel); see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right of 
confrontation);  see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (the right to a speedy 
36
mirrored the Canadian arguments.
The American debate over fundamental fairness as a means of 
incorporating basic rights parallels differing interpretations of the 
“principles of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter.  The 
two principal views concerning the meaning of “fundamental justice” 
could be summarized as the view that it is synonymous with “natural 
justice” or that it provided something more.  “Natural justice,” a 
principle of Canadian administrative law, is essentially a requirement 
of adjudicative fairness encompassing both a right of the affected party 
to be heard by the adjudicative body, and that the body be an impartial 
and independent one.  The other view is termed a “purposive” analysis 
of fundamental justice, because it seeks to identify and implement the 
purposes of the Charter.  
Stated generally, the purposive view is that fundamental justice
encompasses more than just a right to participate in a fair and unbiased 
adjudicatory proceeding, and that it includes more than just the 
specific procedural rights which are themselves guaranteed in §§ 8-14 
of the Charter.  Instead, the principles of fundamental justice under 
this view, set forth in one of the first cases interpreting section 7, are 
found in “the basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial 
process, but also of other components of our legal system.”113  It is the 
purposive view that the Supreme Court of Canada adopted early and 
trial); see Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (the right to a jury trial);  
see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the right to compulsory process); see
Washington v. Texas, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).  The Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.1 (1964), and prohibition 
on double jeopardy have been incorporated.  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 
(1969).  The only unincorporated trial rights in the bill of rights are the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail, and the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement that infamous crimes be prosecuted by indictment.   That the debate 
about what rights are incorporated has ended does not in any sense mean that the 
debate about their scope or meaning has ended, it simply is no longer a matter of 
what is “fundamentally fair.”
113Compare, Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486, 512, with Palko, 302 U.S. at 328 (holding the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process inquiry requires asking whether a state procedure “violates those 
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions”).
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has maintained.114
While many of the principles of fundamental justice under this 
view may be procedural, as one scholar has explained, “[In Re B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act the Court] made clear that ‘fundamental justice’ in 
section 7 is not limited to procedural justice, but extends to matters of 
substance.”115  Some are substantive limitations upon the 
government’s ability to criminalize conduct, for example the 
government’s ability to criminalize and penalize with imprisonment 
following conviction for an “absolute liability” offense (i.e., one 
requiring no criminal mental state, and admitting no defense of 
reasonable mistake). 
The significance of the jurisprudential direction the Supreme 
Court of Canada took in rejecting the “fundamental justice as natural 
justice” view can hardly be overstated.116  The “fundamental justice as 
natural justice” view is similar to the American notion of due process 
espoused by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black.  According to 
Justice Black, “due process” required no particular procedural 
protections beyond those applicable in the specific constitutional 
guarantees, and provided only a “right to be tried by independent and 
unprejudiced courts using established procedures and applying valid 
pre-existing laws.”117  Thus, state practices which were contrary to 
traditional rules of American criminal procedure – but which did not 
violate any particular guarantee in the Bill of Rights – did not violate 
114See Vincent M. Del Buono, The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Purpose 
Interpretation of the Charter, 48 C.R. (Articles) (3d) 121 [19??]. 
115Dennis Klinck, The Charter and Substantive Criminal “Justice,” 42  U. N.B. L. J.
191, 193 (1993). 
116One scholar has put the significance of the decision this way:
The rejection of the equation between ‘natural justice’ and the ‘principles of 
fundamental justice’ is of momentous consequence.  It means that the 
phrase ‘the principles of fundamental justice is not a term of legal art 
referable to a precise meaning known in law.  Rather, the phrase describes a 
method of analysis that will serve to define it on a case-by-case basis.  
David M. Paciocco, CHARTER PRINCIPLES AND PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES
108 (1987). 
117Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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due process, so long as they were applied even-handedly.118  For 
example, applying this view to a Canadian fundamental justice 
analysis, the fact that the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act 
imposed conviction and mandatory imprisonment for driving on a 
suspended license, without regard to whether the driver knew her 
license had been suspended or even reasonably believed that it had not 
been suspended, would not necessarily violate fundamental justice, so 
long as the rule had been properly and previously enacted, and was 
applied in a fair and unbiased manner.  The fact that the common law 
had long traditionally considered mens rea to be an element of any 
offense would not be dispositive under the “natural justice” view.
In contrast, the “purposive” view of fundamental justice, that 
gives it a meaning independent from that of the specific guarantees in 
sections 8-14,119 is much more like the fundamental fairness theory of 
due process.  It involves appeal to the “basic tenets of [one’s] legal 
system,”120  which are simultaneously widely held (so perhaps 
majoritarian) yet also (as doctrine, or even dogma) elusive and 
difficult to challenge.  Under the purposive view, adopted by all the 
members of the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference Re: Section 
94(2) Motor Vehicles Act (B.C.), an absolute liability offense violates 
fundamental justice because - as enacted with mandatory 
imprisonment - it necessarily deprived one of liberty.
Why is it permissible for the Court to apply the basic guarantee 
of adjudicative fairness in the case of an absolute liability offense that 
violates no specific entrenched right?  Because both the “purposive 
view” of fundamental justice and the fundamental fairness 
interpretations of due process reflected an expansive view of the 
relationship between the basic guarantee and the enumerated rights.121
118See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not a constitutional prerequisite of due 
process).
119R. v. Hebert, 2 S.C.R. 151 (1990) (holding it is incorrect to assume fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the charter are cast forever in the strait-jacket of the law as it 
stood in 1982, so a fundamental principle of justice may be broader and more general 
than the particular rules which exemplify it).
120
 Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), 2 S.C.R. 486, 498 (1985).
121Cf. Reference Re Section 94(2) Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), 2 S.C.R. 486, 498 
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This expansive view necessarily means greater opportunity for the 
exercise of judicial authority.        
Did the framers of section 7 simply err about their ability to 
control judicial readiness to engage in normative review of the wisdom 
of policies or laws?  They were not wrong; they simply were focused 
on an inapplicable analogy.  The Lecher-era debate about “substantive 
due process” was inapplicable to the Canadian guarantee of 
“fundamental justice” because the constitutional principles at issue 
involved different legal relationships.  Although both fundamental 
justice and substantive due process at first glance involve restrictions 
on the government’s authority to force people to change their 
behavior, this oversimplifies how the doctrines impact both individuals 
and different types of government authority. 
Substantive due process was a jurisprudence that limited the 
political branches’ ability to affect relations between individuals, 
rather than between the state and an individual.  That is, while Lecher
itself involved directly the ability of the state to enforce wage and hour 
legislation against individuals (employers), the larger significance of 
the doctrine of substantive due process is that it indirectly precluded 
the political branches from regulating a large array of social and 
economic relationships between individuals (such as between 
employers and employees).122  It was a theory that certain areas of 
interaction between private parties were beyond the purview of state 
regulation - and were even constitutionally protected from this 
regulation.  As such, Lecher has come to be seen essentially as 
protection for an economic or political status quo, because it cordoned 
off areas of behavior between individuals from government regulation.
The principle of fundamental justice, by contrast, concerns the 
(1985).
122The source of Lochner’s insulation of private relationships from state intervention 
has recently been subject to debate.  Traditional critics, following Holmes’ dissent, 
find the source in laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism.  Modern 
revisionists place its source in less intellectually odious, Jacksonian anti-class 
legislation impulses.  See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 
20-21, Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper 
No. 52, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=390460.
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relationship between the state and the individual, rather than relations 
between individuals.  Seen from this perspective, the debate 
concerning the incorporation (i.e., application to the states) of the 
specific procedural guarantees in the U.S. bill of rights through the 
fundamental fairness theory of due process123  is much more apt to the 
Canadian experience than that over “substantive due process” as 
applied to social or economic regulation.  Seen from the perspective 
too, this debate may also portend more accurately the fate of 
“fundamental justice” in the hands of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
and may explain why fundamental justice has had such significant 
jurisprudential impact in the area of criminal justice – and much less 
jurisprudential significance elsewhere.  Criminal justice is perhaps the 
area of law epitomizing the essential relation between the state and the 
individual: it is the area under which the state can restrict the most 
basic aspects of autonomy, such as life, liberty, personal security and 
property. 
V. How Will Each Model Fare in the New Reality?
How will the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States 
assess the legality of the increased restrictions on individual liberties 
resulting from the global war on terrorism?124  Neither Court has 
123Professor Paciocco presciently concluded in 1987 that “I would maintain that it is 
in the [American] incorporation doctrine cases that we can find the most guidance 
from American jurisprudence.”  David M. Paciocco, CHARTER PRINCIPLES AND 
PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES 182-83 (1987). 
124These challenges include, in the United States, the effects of the USA PATRIOT 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), and in Canada the effects of the Anti-
Terrorism Act (Bill C-36). On the PATRIOT Act, see generally, Charles Doyle, The 
USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis (April 15, 2002), Cong. Res. Svc. Rept. No. 
RL31377.  On Bill C-36, see generally, RONALD J. DANIELS, PATRICK MACKLEM, & 
KENT ROACH eds, THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-
TERRORISM BILL (TORONTO, 2001).  These questions are not unique to either the U.S. 
or Canadian legal systems.  See, e.g., Elena Katselli & Sangeeta Shah, September 11 
and the UK Response in Current Developments: Public International Law, 52 INT’L. 
& COMP. L. QTRLY. 245, 253 (2003) (describing Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 
4 of which provides Home Secretary’s issuance of certificate based upon reasonable 
belief that foreign national is a threat to national security and suspected terrorist, 
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considered these restrictions as yet.125  If, as government officials have 
argued,126 the requirements of this conflict are outside the bounds of 
traditional criminal law enforcement,127 and demand some new 
framework that is neither wholly criminal nor wholly military, oriented 
as much to intelligence surveillance as to criminal investigation, then 
the enumerated rights triggered in criminal prosecutions arguably do 
not apply to these situations.128  The permissibility of these new 
restrictions will ultimately then be judged against the basic guarantee 
which permits preventative detention, in contravention to European Convention on 
Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
125The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet been presented with an opportunity to 
undertake such review.  The Canadian response, Bill C-36, became law in December 
2001, and as of August 2002 one commentator opined “we are likely still years away 
from Charter challenges to it.”  Karl Roach, Did September 11 Change Everything?  
Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism, 47 MCGILL L. J.
893, 912 (2002). 
126See generally Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement 
Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 308-313 (2003) (contrasting various 
statements of presidents and public officials made before September 11th, 2001, 
suggesting terrorist activities were principally criminal actions, with post-September 
11th actions of military and intelligence agencies, treating them otherwise).
127See Lorraine E. Weinrib, Terrorism’s Challenge to the Constitutional Order, in 
RONALD J. DANIELS, PATRICK MACKLEM, & KENT ROACH eds, 93 THE SECURITY OF 
FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL (TORONTO, 2001) (Bill C-
36 “reflects the fact that the standard approaches to criminal activity  –  deterrence, 
detection and punishment  – will not satisfy the government’s commitment, in 
concert with other western countries, to prevent further attacks and ultimately 
dismantle these groups.”)
128The application of enumerated rights in these situations may depend upon several 
facts, including whether the person claiming the right is a U.S. citizen or resident 
alien, and whether the right is sought to be applied to domestic or foreign law 
enforcement actions.  Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 
(1990) (Fourth Amendment inapplicable to searches and seizures of foreign persons 
outside the U.S.)  and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950) (Fifth and 
Sixth amendment trial protections inapplicable to enemy aliens fighting U.S.) with 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (U.S. citizens tried abroad by the military entitled 
to Sixth amendment jury trial right).  These cases have recognized that the basic 
guarantee, due process, applies in all contexts.  See United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (recognizing Fifth amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination as “fundamental”); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 53 
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (jury trial for civilian dependent of military 
personnel abroad in capital case a fundamental right). 
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of adjudicative fairness,129 which will make critical the relationship 
between the basic guarantee and the enumerated rights.  
A. Canadian Response to the New Reality
1. Section 1 of the Charter 
Before reviewing the possible ways in which these arguments 
might develop, one key structural difference between the Canadian and 
American guarantees must be highlighted.  As noted earlier, the 
Canadian Charter provides a mechanism by which violations of rights 
it guarantees may nevertheless be found justifiable and upheld.  The 
“savings clause” of section 1 provides that “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”130  This 
section requires both procedural and substantive review of 
governmental justifications for infringements of Charter rights. The 
129The impact of some of the new restrictions have already been judged, at least 
initially, against the basic guarantee.  For example, the U.S. government’s contention 
that certain U.S. citizens detained on U.S. soil were not entitled to basic 
constitutional protections such as the right to counsel, because they were “enemy 
combatants,” was initially rejected under the basic guarantee.  See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 602 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he district court ordered that 
“Hamdi must be allowed to meet with his attorney because of fundamental justice 
provided under the Constitution of the United States.”).  See also Padilla ex rel. 
Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 42, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty violates the Due Process Clause, which applies to all ‘persons’ 
within the United States . . .   [t]he purpose of the ‘some evidence’ standard is to 
assure that the executive has not arbitrarily deprived a person of liberty. . . .   [n]o 
court of which I am aware has applied the ‘some evidence’ standard to a record that 
consists solely of the government’s evidence, to which the government’s adversary 
has not been permitted to respond.”) (citations omitted).
U.S. courts have previously relied on the basic guarantee to evaluate the 
constitutionality of procedures that, under the limited model, have been held to fall 
outside the scope of an enumerated right.  See Untied States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 
1091-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (extraterritorial searches against U.S. citizens that adhered to 
the host country’s laws and did not “shock the conscience” were “reasonable” and so 
satisfied Fourth amendment).
130
 CAN. CONST.  (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), § 1.
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“prescribed by law” clause of section 1 has been held a requirement of 
procedural regularity,131 while the “demonstrably justified” clause 
imposes a substantive proportionality review.  
The Supreme Court of Canada has developed a two part 
means-ends test for section 1 arguments offered by the government 
(i.e., the claim that a law which infringes a Charter right is 
nevertheless justified under section 1) in connection with the Court’s 
substantive review.  First, with respect to the ends for which the 
Charter right is restricted, the “objective of the law limiting the Charter 
right or freedom must be of sufficient importance to warrant 
overriding it.”132  Second, with respect to the means by which the right 
is restricted, these must be:
proportional to the objective and the effect of the law –
proportionate, in short, to the good which it may produce.  
Three matters are considered in determining proportionality: 
the measures chosen must be rationally connected to the 
objective; they must impair the guaranteed right or freedom as 
little as reasonably possible; and there must be overall 
proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures 
and the salutary effects of the law.133
The “savings” clause in section 1 of the Charter thus functions 
as the converse of the basic guarantee in the United States constitution.  
Whereas due process, under the United States constitution, functions 
as a case-specific standard that can invalidate a law or a process, 
section 1, by contrast, functions as a case-specific (or context-specific) 
standard that can validate or justify a violation of enumerated rights. 
There is no textual or functional analogue in the United States 
131See R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, par 60 (“limit will be prescribed by law 
within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or 
results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its 
operating requirements . . . . [or] from the application of a common law rule”).
132R.J.R. MacDonald Inc. v. A.G. of Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 329-330, citing R. 
v. Oakes, [1986] 50 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
133Id.
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Constitution to this mechanism of both recognizing and justifying an 
infringement.134  In order to reach a result that ends justify means 
which would appear in conflict with a constitutional guarantee, the 
U.S. Supreme Court must find either that a right has not been 
violated135 or that it is inapplicable in a given situation.136  The 
Canadian structure is thought – at least by Canadian jurists – to permit 
more coherent development of rights jurisprudence, with allowance for 
exceptional circumstances through section 1.137  It is certainly possible 
134There are of course means-ends analyses, routinely applied in challenges under the 
equality guarantee (equal protection) and the guarantee of substantive due process.  
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, ___U.S.___, (2003) (invalidating sodomy statutes, as 
applied to all persons  –  homosexual and heterosexual – because of fundamental 
right of privacy, and noting  “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to 
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are 
linked in important respects”).  The court may also find, however, that even if a 
fundamental right is implicated by a law or practice, the law or practice simply does 
not violate the right.  See, e.g., Sell v. United States,  ___U.S.___, (June 16, 2003) 
(fundamental right to liberty includes freedom from involuntary medication, but 
involuntary psychoactive medication of a criminal defendant to render them 
competent to stand trial does not violate this liberty interest if, “taking account of 
less intrusive alternatives, it is necessary significantly to further important
government interests”).  Proportionality review in general appears a virtually 
universal phenomenon.  See David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 AM. J. COMP. L.
131, 136-37 (1996).
135
136See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1994 (2003) (police 
officers’ questioning of plaintiff, following their shooting of him, was clearly 
coercive and so violated fifth amendment’s privilege against self incrimination, but 
privilege inapplicable in civil context).
137One member of the Canadian Supreme Court, in comparing the U.S. and Canadian 
Constitutions, has described section 1 as the most significant difference between the 
documents.  Hon. Claire L Heureux-Dubé, Two Supreme Courts: A Study in Contrast
in THE CANADIAN & AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 158
(Marian C. McKenna, ed. 1993).  As to section 1's effect on the task of evaluating 
the constitutionality of limits on freedoms, Justice L Heureux-Dubé has explained:
This section is of vital importance because it means that in Canada we are 
able to give an extremely wide interpretation to the enumerated rights as a 
substantive matter and then engage in the process of determining whether 
any limitation on that right may subsequently be justified by the party 
seeking to encroach upon it.  The Americans, of course, find themselves 
without any such clause and have been forced to limit their rights at the 
level of the right itself.  This results in radically different reasoning 
processes.
45
that even if the Supreme Court of Canada finds the Canadian response 
works a deprivation of Charter rights in violation of fundamental 
justice, it may nevertheless find that the new reality of preventing an 
increased threat of terrorism is a sufficient end, and that the means are 
proportional to this end, to satisfy section 1.138  To date, the Court has 
been extremely reluctant to find violations of fundamental justice 
“saved” under section 1,139 and criminal procedure is an area in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada has explained it has special institutional 
competence.140
Id.  As one commentator has explained: “This formal difference between the 
American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter does not make the American 
Jurisprudence irrelevant, of course, but it does require the Canadian courts to 
develop their own patterns of reasoning , which must take account not only of the 
guaranteed rights but also of the limitation clause of s. 1.”  Peter W. Hogg, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 2d Ed. 680 (Toronto, Canada: 1985).
138Ziyaad E. Mia, Terrorizing the Rule of Law: Implications of the Anti-terrorism 
Act, 14 NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 125, 149 (2001) ( “Despite the fact that the [Anti-
Terrorism Act] will likely violate Charter rights and hence erode the rule of law, 
courts may be inclined to be more deferential to the state in circumstances of a 
perceived threat to ‘national security.’”)  Even if the Court invalidates a restriction 
on Charter rights, and finds that it is not “saved” by section 1, Parliament could still 
override this judgment under section 33.  See note ___.
139See notes ___ infra.
140The Canadian Supreme Court has identified criminal procedure matters, since they 
involve the relationship between the individual and the state, as ones within special 
institutional competence of courts to decide. See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927, para. 80.
In other cases, however, rather than mediating between different groups, the 
government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of the individual 
whose right has been infringed. For example, in justifying an infringement 
of legal rights enshrined in ss. 7 to 14 of the Charter, the state, on behalf of 
the whole community, typically will assert its responsibility for prosecuting 
crime whereas the individual will assert the paramountcy of principles of 
fundamental justice. There might not be any further  competing claims 
among different groups. In such circumstances, and indeed whenever the 
government's purpose relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judicial system, the courts can assess with some certainty whether the 
"least drastic means" for achieving the purpose have been chosen, 
especially given their accumulated experience in dealing with such 
questions: See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 245, at 
p. 276. The same degree of certainty may not be achievable in cases 
involving the reconciliation of claims of competing individuals or groups or 
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2. Bill C-36
The Canadian response to the new reality is the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (Bill C-36)141 which, according to the government of Canada, 
includes “measures to deter, disable, identify, prosecute, convict and 
punish terrorists.”142  Unlike the American response, the legislative 
consideration of Bill C-36 included scholarly participation and 
testimony, and the legislation itself was the subject of extensive 
academic debate.143
Bill C-36 impacts protections for individuals in the criminal 
process in at least three significant ways.  First, it creates a definition 
of “terrorism” that can be applied to a group or individual by executive 
decision, with limited ability to effectively challenge this 
determination in court.  Designation as a “terrorist” or engaging in 
“terrorist activities” then triggers special government powers and 
creates new offenses.  The special government powers include 
authority to prohibit financial interaction with a group engaging in 
terrorist activities, and to seek forfeiture of its property.  The new 
offenses include knowingly participating, or contributing to –   either 
directly or indirectly – such a group’s activities,144 or instructing 
anyone to carry out any activity for the benefit of a terrorist group.145
the distribution of scarce government resources.
(Emphasis supplied.)
141Bill C-36 received royal assent December 18, 2001.  Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 
136, Extra (07-24-2002)
142Department of Justice (Canada), Anti-Terrorism Act Receives Royal Assent 
(December 18, 2001) (http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_28215.html) 
143See Stephen J. Toope, Fallout from ‘9-11': Will a Security Culture Undermine 
Human Rights?, 66 SASK. L. REV. 281 (2002); Kent Roach, Did September 11 
Change Everything?  Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of 
Terrorism, 47 MCGILL L. J. 893, 912 (2002); Various Authors, Special Notes on Bill 
C-36, 60 U. TORONTO FAC. L. Rev. 65 (2002); Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and 
Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies, 14 NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 13 (2001), all 
reprinted in, RONALD J. DANIELS, PATRICK MACKLEM, & KENT ROACH eds, THE 
SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL (TORONTO, 
2001).
144Bill C-36, §83.18(1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
145Bill C-36, §83.21(1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
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Second, the law establishes a procedure for investigative 
hearings, at which testimony may be compelled (although neither it 
nor its fruits can be used against the testifying witness, except for a 
perjury prosecution), involving terrorists or suspected terrorists.  
Third, the law creates a mechanism for warrantless preventive arrests 
of suspected terrorists.  These preventive arrests, combined with a 
scheme of “release upon condition,” could easily result in preventive 
detention without charge.  The legislation also adds a variety of 
investigative powers involving electronic surveillance and financial 
disclosure.146
Many of Bill C-36's provisions are keyed to its definition of 
terrorism, which provides two bases for finding someone a “terrorist” 
or engaging in “terrorist activity.”147  Under the first branch of the 
definition, an act that is an offense against any of ten international 
agreements constitutes terrorism.148  Under the second, and far more 
controversial, branch of the definition, any act or omission committed 
anywhere in the world, done at least in part for a political, religious or 
ideological purpose, objective or cause, with the intent of intimidating 
someone with respect to their security, or to compel a person or 
government to do or refrain from any act, may be a terrorist act.149  In 
order for such acts to qualify as “terrorist” activities, they need to have 
intentionally caused death or serious bodily harm by violence, 
endangered a life, caused serious risk to the public’s health or safety, 
substantial property damage, or:
cause[d] serious interference with or serious disruption of an 
essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, 
other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage 
of work that is not intended to result in [death or serious bodily 
harm by violence, endangered a life, caused serious risk to the 
public’s health or safety].150
146Bill C-36, ___ (Electronic surveillance), 
147Bill C-36, §83.01(1)(a) & (b) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
148Bill C-36, §83.01(1)(a)(i-x) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
149Bill C-36, §83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) & (B) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
150Bill C-36, §83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
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In addition to this broad definition of terrorist activity, a group 
may be designated a “terrorist group” through an executive decision 
that provides only a very narrow opportunity for judicial challenge.  A 
“terrorist group” may thus be either an entity that has as one of its 
purposes or activities facilitating any terrorist activity, or simply one 
that is “listed” by the Governor in Council upon the recommendation 
of the Solicitor General.151  Listing is an executive decision152 that can 
be reviewed after the fact by a judge, upon a listing entity’s application 
within 60 days.153
The procedure by which the judge reviews challenges to the 
listing is significantly different from a full criminal trial.  It is private, 
not public, and may be conducted in the absence of the listed entity 
and its counsel, if disclosure of the information would injure national 
security.154  While the judge must provide the listed entity a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard,155 and with a summary of the information 
upon which she is relying and the reasons for the decision,156 she need 
not disclose any information that would endanger national security or 
endanger any person,157 and may consider any information in making 
her decision, including information that would be inadmissible under 
Canadian law.158  She need only find that the designation is 
“reasonable.”159
This provision received criticism from academics,160 bar 
151Bill C-36, §83.01(1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
152Bill C-36, §83.05(1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
153Bill C-36, §83.05(5) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
154Bill C-36, §83.05(6)(a) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
155Bill C-36, §83.05(6)(c) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
156Bill C-36, §83.05(6)(b) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
157Id.
158Bill C-36, §83.05(6.1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
159Bill C-36, §83.05(6)(d) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
160Don Stuart, The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36: An Unnecessary Law and Order Quick 
Fix that Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System, 14 NAT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 153 (2000-01) (“The fatal flaw in Bill C-36 is its definition of “terrorist 
activity” in section 83.01.  It decides who can be charged as a terrorist and against 
whom extensive new investigative powers can be exercised.”).
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organizations,161 and some members of Parliament,162 as being 
susceptible to use against those engaged in legitimate dissent, protest 
or strike.  Section (b)(ii)(E) was challenged as “particularly 
problematic in that it might catch unlawful activity  –  such as a 
wildcat strike or demonstration  –  that is not terrorist conduct, even 
though there may be a ‘serious disruption of an essential service, 
facility or system.’”163 The provisions authorizing executive listing of 
entities, it has already been argued, to the extent that it is “based 
merely on reasonable grounds rather than proof in a court of law [,] . . . 
surely violates presumption of innocence and fair trial guarantees 
under section 11(d) of the Charter.”164  Moreover, because  many of 
the new terrorism offenses are inchoate activities, involving financing 
or facilitating preparations for actual offenses, they may face challenge 
under section 7 as being so vague they fail to provide a defendant 
adequate notice or to effectively limit the exercise of discretion by law 
enforcement, or that they are overbroad given the goal of curbing 
terrorism.165
The second significant aspect of the bill is its authorization of 
“preventive arrests.”  These may be based on reasonable grounds to 
suspect terrorist activity will be carried out and that arrest is necessary 
to prevent it, which may be made without a warrant.166  While 
Canadian police could already arrest someone they had reasonable 
161Canadian Bar Association, “Submission on Bill C-36 Anti-terrorism Act" 
(October 2001) (available at http://www.cba.org/cba/pdf/submission.pdf).
162Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies, 14 
NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 13, 34-36 (2000-2001).  Cotler is a Liberal M.P. 
163Canadian Bar Association,“Submission on Bill C-36 Anti-terrorism Act” 19 
(October 2001) (available at http://www.cba.org/cba/pdf/submission.pdf).  This was 
also noted as potentially “vulnerable to a challenge under section 15 of the Charter 
which prohibits various grounds of discrimination.”  Id.
164Don Stuart, The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36: An Unnecessary Law and Order Quick 
Fix that Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System, 14 NAT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 153, 156 (2000-01). 
165Kent Roach, The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to 
Terrorism, in RONALD J. DANIELS, PATRICK MACKLEM, & KENT ROACH eds, THE 
SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 162-63 
(TORONTO, 2001). 
166Bill C-36, §83.3 CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
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grounds to believe had committed or was “about to commit an 
indictable offence,”167 Bill C-36's preventive arrest provision does not 
require that the offense be imminent.  Persons subject to these arrests 
must be brought before a provincial judge within twenty-four hours or 
as soon as possible, and may be detained for no more than an 
additional forty-eight hours,168 unless an information has been laid 
against them, in which case they are subject to setting of bail 
conditions, which may include preventive detention.
Perhaps most significantly, persons subject to preventive arrest 
may be released with conditions set by the court, which can last up to 
twelve months.169  Failure to agree to these conditions, or to abide by 
them, can result in continued detention.170  In other words, a person 
suspected of planning to commit a terrorist act at some undetermined 
point in the future may be jailed for up to a year if they refuse or fail to 
abide by conditions of release.  These may include prohibitions on 
possession of certain lawful weapons, and “any other reasonable 
conditions . . . that the provincial court judge considers desirable for 
preventing the carrying out of a terrorist activity.”171
Third, Bill C-36 provides for “investigative hearings,” to which 
persons may be summonsed and ordered to testify.172  Application for 
orders to gather information through an investigative hearing must be 
approved by the Attorney General,173 and require a showing that a 
terrorism offense has been committed and that information concerning 
it or the whereabouts of its perpetrators is likely to be revealed by the 
order, or there are reasonable grounds to believe a terrorism offense 
will be committed, that a person has direct and material information 
concerning the offense or the whereabouts of someone who may 
commit one, and reasonable attempts to obtain this information have 
167§ 495(1) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
168Bill C-36, §83.3(6) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
169Bill C-36, §83.3(8), (10) & (11) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
170Bill C-36, §83.3(9) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
171Bill C-36, §83.3(8)(a) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
172Bill C-36, §83.28 CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
173Bill C-36, §83.28(3) CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
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failed.174
The preventive arrest and investigative hearing provisions both 
pose a “risk of prejudice to the right to remain silent, as guaranteed 
under section 7 of the Charter.”175  They have been characterized as 
“[e]specially troubling . . . extraordinarily un-Canadian powers to 
detain without charge and to compel testimony . . . .”176  The 
preventive arrest provisions have been alleged to violate several 
enumerated Charter rights,177 including the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained, to be informed promptly of the reason for the detention, to be 
informed of the specific offense and to have the detention validated 
through a habeas corpus action.  While the Supreme Court of Canada 
might examine the provisions of Bill C-36 in the context of other 
criminal proceedings, it might also recognize special problems 
presented by terrorism  – and still find that some of these provisions 
violate fundamental justice under an expansive model.  Two recent 
cases in which the Court considered challenges under fundamental 
justice, one involving alleged terrorism and the other murder, suggest 
this.  
In United States v. Burns and Rafay,178 and Suresh v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),179 the Court recently held 
that fundamental justice prohibited extraditions of defendants facing a 
potential death penalty or torture.  The Court expressly decided both of 
these cases as matters of fundamental justice, specifically rejecting the 
174Bill C-36, §83.28(4)(a) & (b), CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.
175Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies, 14 
NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 13, 45 (2000-2001).
176Don Stuart, The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36: An Unnecessary Law and Order Quick 
Fix that Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System, 14 NAT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 153, 159(2000-2001). 
177Ziyaad E. Mia, Terrorizing the Rule of Law: Implications of the Anti-terrorism 
Act, 14 NAT’L. J. CONST. L. 125, 134 (2001) (“At a minimum, the ‘preventive arrest’ 
provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act violate all of the aforementioned Charter rights.”
1781 S.C.R. 283 (2001) (extradition to U.S. without assurances that death penalty 
would not be sought violated fundamental justice because of demonstrated potential 
for miscarriages of justice). 
1791 S.C.R. 3 (2002) (extradition to country in which petitioner would face torture 
violated fundamental justice).
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arguments in one that the extradition would violate Section 12 of the 
Charter, guaranteeing “the right not to be subjected to any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment.”180  It articulated an extraordinarily 
expansive notion of fundamental justice, in that it exceeded the 
nation’s borders.  In both cases, the alleged violation of fundamental 
justice (the potential imposition of the death penalty or the use of 
torture in the demanding country) would be committed outside Canada 
by non-Canadians. The Court rejected the argument that fundamental 
justice did not require looking beyond the actions of the Canadian 
government to an entirely foreseeable consequence” of its “necessary 
participation.”181  It reached these conclusions despite the fact that the 
petitioner in Suresh  was alleged to be a member of a terrorist 
organization.182
Suresh also suggests how the Supreme Court of Canada might 
consider some of the provisions in Bill C-36.  While clearly advancing 
an expansive notion of the basic guarantee, by holding that extradition 
to a country in which a petitioner would face torture was a violation of 
fundamental justice, the Court actually upheld the authority of the 
government to find the petitioner a danger to Canadian security and 
deport him  --  after a procedure that afforded him greater procedural 
protections.  The Court did not find that the petitioner was entitled to a 
full judicial hearing, but rather that he was entitled under the principles 
180Burns at Par. 57.  (“The degree of causal remoteness between the extradition order 
to face trial and the potential imposition of capital punishment as one of many 
possible outcomes to this prosecution make this a case more appropriately reviewed 
under s. 7 than under s. 12. It must be kept in mind that the values underlying various 
sections of the Charter, including s. 12, form part of the balancing process engaged 
in under s. 7.”)
181Suresh, 1 S.C.R. 3, Par. 54 (2002) (“[T]he governing principle was a general one -
namely, that the guarantee of fundamental justice applies even to deprivations of life, 
liberty or security effected by actors other than our government, if there is a 
sufficient causal connection between our government's participation and the 
deprivation ultimately effected. We reaffirm that principle here. At least where 
Canada's participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation and where the 
deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of Canada's participation, the 
government does not avoid the guarantee of fundamental justice merely because the 
deprivation in question would be effected by someone else's hand.”) 
182Id., at par. ___.
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of fundamental justice to some procedure.183  The procedure required 
was at least an opportunity to know the information upon which the 
government’s decision to deport had been made (“subject to privilege 
or similar valid reasons for reduced disclosure, such as safeguarding 
confidential public security documents”184), to be heard, and to 
challenge the information offered against him.185  The Court stressed 
that the process due under the principles of fundamental justice would 
be highly case-specific.186
The expansive model of the relationship between the basic 
guarantee and enumerated rights could more clearly identify conflicts 
between Bill C-36 and fundamental justice than the narrow model of 
this relationship.  The Canadian government made much vaunted 
efforts to “Charter-proof” Bill C-36.187  These resulted in protections 
for the individual, such as grants of use and derivative use immunity 
for testimony given in investigative hearings, and the right to retain 
and instruct counsel during the hearings.188  These “Charter-proofing” 
provisions, that ostensibly provide the enumerated rights, mean that it 
is ultimately the basic guarantee that will be the measure of Bill C-36's 
constitutionality.  The protections in investigative hearings, for 
example, mean that it will be very difficult to argue that the right 
against compelled self-incrimination is violated by the compelled 
testimony in an investigative hearing.189  Thus if there is something 
constitutionally problematic about the process of forcing someone to 
183Id., at par. 121.
184Id., at par. 122.
185Id., par. 122-123.
186Id., par. 127. (“If the refugee establishes that torture is a real possibility, the 
Minister must provide the refugee with all the relevant information and advice she 
intends to rely on, provide the refugee an opportunity to address that evidence in 
writing, and after considering all the relevant information, issue responsive written 
reasons. This is the minimum required to meet the duty of fairness and fulfill the 
requirements of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.”)
187Kent Roach, The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to 
Terrorism, in RONALD J. DANIELS, PATRICK MACKLEM, & KENT ROACH eds, THE 
SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 133-34 
(TORONTO, 2001) (citing comments from Minister of Justice).
188Id., 135-36.
189Id., 136, and see Roach at note 25.  
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testify under these circumstances about matters that may incriminate 
them, it will have to be because the entire process somehow violates 
the basic guarantee.  
This type of a test will naturally give rise to a justification 
under sec. 1.  The Supreme Court of Canada has shown great 
reluctance to uphold under section 1 a law which violated fundamental 
justice.190  However, it has identified the types of conditions that might 
justify under section 1 restrictions in violation of fundamental justice.  
“[E]xceptional circumstances, such as the outbreak of war or a 
national emergency, are necessary before such an infringement may be 
justified.”191
B. U.S. Response to the New Reality
The legal response to the new reality in the United States is still 
unfolding, but it includes several components that have a direct impact 
on procedural protections in the criminal process.192  The most 
190See R. v. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687 (2001), Par. 92 (holding section 1did not save 
statutory definition of duress, which required immediacy of threat and presence of 
threatener, thereby violating fundamental justice by permitting conviction for acts 
that were morally involuntary); New Brunswick (Minister of Health & Community 
Services) v. G. (J.), 3 S.C.R. 46 (1999), Par. 99 (provincial statue that did not 
provide funding for counsel for indigent parents facing hearing concerning custody 
order to remove their children violated fundamental justice and was not saved by 
section 1, even though Charter did not protect parental liberty because removal of 
one’s children threatened psychological security of the person, guaranteed by the 
Charter, and fair hearing could not be guaranteed without counsel).  
191R. v. Ruzic, 1 S.C.R. 687 (2001), Par. 92 (holding section 1did not save statutory 
definition of duress, which required immediacy of threat and presence of threatener, 
thereby violating fundamental justice by permitting conviction for acts that were 
morally involuntary).  See also Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 
(British Columbia), 2 S.C.R. 486, 518 (1985) (“Section 1may, for reasons of 
administrative expediency, successfully come to the rescue of an otherwise violation 
of s. 7, but only in cases arising out of exceptional conditions, such as natural 
disasters, the outbreak of war, epidemics, and the like.”)
192The response includes executive designations, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224 (66 
FED.REG. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (designating certain groups terrorist organizations 
and “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” subject to blocking of their property 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 USC § 1701 et seq.).
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significant of these are the USA Patriot Act193 and the proposed 
“Patriot Act II.”194
 The Patriot Act has expanded the government’s ability to 
engage in electronic surveillance and use secret investigative 
techniques in both traditional criminal law enforcement investigations 
and intelligence investigations.  The Patriot Act also provides more 
extensive obligations on the part of financial institutions to collect and 
report to the government information concerning suspicious 
transactions.  Finally, the Act adds definitions for new terrorism-
related offenses.
Electronic surveillance and secret search procedures (i.e., 
without notice to the person searched) for traditional criminal law 
enforcement investigations have been accorded  the highest degree of 
protection for the individual.  They were permissible only pursuant to 
special warrants under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968.195  Similar intrusions for intelligence 
investigations have carried a lower degree of protection for the 
individual, on the theory that the national security needs of intelligence 
investigations are high, and they often result in something other than a  
traditional criminal prosecution.  Electronic surveillance and secret 
searches undertaken for intelligence investigations are governed under 
a separate statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA).196  FISA authorizes electronic surveillance197 and secret (i.e., 
undisclosed) physical searches,198 and creates a special (secret) court 
to hear applications for authorizations to make these intrusions in 
connection with intelligence investigations. 
Authority to engage in electronic surveillance and surreptitious 
193Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
194The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Patriot II) has not been 
formally proposed in Congress, although a Department of Justice version has been 
leaked to the press.  See
19518 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (“Title III”).
19650 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 2002).
19750 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 2002).
19850 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821-1829 (West Supp. 2002).
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searches has generally been subject to three levels of control in the 
United States, that differ depending upon the degree of intrusiveness 
of the action and the expectation of privacy that attaches to the 
communication.  The surveillance and search provisions of the Patriot 
Act affect all three levels of procedural protections afforded 
individuals in the criminal process.  First, the Act expands the 
communications that are susceptible to the most intrusive forms of 
electronic surveillance.  These communications –  private face-to-face 
conversations, conversations by land-line telephone, and computer 
communications – are the most highly protected, and may only be 
eavesdropped upon or intercepted after prior authorization by a 
judge,199 upon the request of a high government official,200 and after 
finding probable cause that particular communications will be made 
about a particular enumerated offense.201  These serious offenses that 
can trigger a Title III-authorized intrusion.  now includes terrorist and 
computer crimes.202
Second, the Act also expands government access to a less-
protected category of information, that held by third parties, such as 
telephone records (but not conversations) and e-mail held in a third 
party’s storage.  The Act provides that these materials, including 
stored e-mail, may be obtained with a search warrant.203  If the 
information has been in storage over 180 days, information may be 
obtained without disclosure of the warrant to the subscriber.204
Telephone records may also be obtained, pursuant to a warrant, 
without notice to the subscriber.205  This information can be obtained 
upon a showing of “reasonable grounds” to believe the information is 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.206
Finally, the Act also expands government authority to obtain 
19918 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000)
20018 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (West Supp. 2003)
20118 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000).
20218 U.S.C. § 2516 (West Supp. 2003)
20318 U.S.C. §2703(a). 
20418 U.S.C. §2703(a) & (b).
20518 U.S.C. §2703(c).
20618 U.S.C. §2703(d).
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communications-related information that is the least-protected: the 
details  concerning to whom and when calls are placed from a specific 
phone.  The Act expands the use of “trap & trace devices” and “pen 
registers” by permitting their use for email as well as telephones.207
These devices can be authorized by court order based only upon a 
showing that “information likely to be obtained by such installation 
and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”208  No 
revelation to the subscriber is ever permitted unless a court later orders 
it.209
Perhaps most significantly for protection of the individual, the
Patriot Act blurs the distinction between traditional law enforcement 
and intelligence investigations.210  It does this in two ways.  First, it 
explicitly authorizes any government official to disclose the fruits of 
electronically intercepted communications to any federal defense, 
intelligence, law enforcement, national security, immigration or 
“protective” official, to the extent that the communications include 
foreign intelligence information.211  The use that may be made of such 
information is limited only that which is “necessary to the conduct of 
that person’s official duties.”212  Thus everything that might be learned 
under the reduced requirements for intelligence gathering, to the extent 
that it concerns foreign intelligence, may now be used for traditional 
law enforcement.
Second, the purpose of information gathering in intelligence 
investigations, through electronic surveillance or secret searches,  can 
now include traditional law enforcement.  The Act eliminates the 
requirement that “the purpose for the surveillance is to obtain foreign 
20718 U.S.C. §3123(a).
208Id.
20918 U.S.C. §3123(d).
210Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 307, 313 (2003) (“prior to September 11th we were for the most 
part dedicated to utilizing the civilian criminal justice system to adjudicate terrorist 
cases”).  The legal responses also includes dramatic changes to the treatment of non-
citizens.
21118 U.S.C. § 2517(6)-(8) (West Supp. 2003)
212Id.
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intelligence information,” and instead requires only that “a significant
purpose” of the surveillance or search authorization be obtaining 
intelligence.213  This is a significant change, because the few lower 
courts which have considered challenges to intelligence investigations 
have upheld them on the basis that their primary purpose was not 
obtaining information for a criminal prosecution.214
The restrictions in the Patriot Act (and the changes in FISA) 
largely involve intrusions (i.e., surveillance or searches), so will likely 
be tested under the Fourth Amendment.  However, because the 
restrictions involve intrusions that are arguably not for the purpose of 
traditional criminal law enforcement, it is the qualitative guarantee 
(i.e., the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures) that will be most significant.215  This 
proportionality consideration, whether the “standards . . . are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for 
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens,”216 is 
really no different than the basic guarantee of substantive due process.  
In the limited model for application of the basic guarantee, 
since an enumerated right (the Fourth amendment) does apply, no 
21350 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) (Thompson West 2003).
214See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir.), cert. den. 486 U.S. 1010 
(1987); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Megahey, 
553 F.Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y), aff’d 729 F.2d 1444 (1982).  See Note, The Fuss over 
Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA Patriot Act Amendments to 
FISA under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291 (2003).
215The notion that some ultimate, substantive judgment must be made about the 
application of the restrictions imposed under the new reality has appeared in several 
cases, although not always as an explicit due process or fundamental justice matter.  
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Int.Surv.Ct.Rev., Nov 18, 2002) 
(“Ultimately, the question [concerning the constitutionality of FISA orders used to 
obtain information primarily for a criminal investigation] becomes whether FISA, as 
amended by the Patriot Act, is a reasonable response based on a balance of the 
legitimate need of the government for foreign intelligence information to protect 
against national security threats with the protected rights of citizens.”).  See also note 
129, supra (Re: Hamdi & Padilla cases).
216United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972) 
(domestic security needs may permit standards for intrusions that are constitutional 
yet different from those required in ordinary law enforcement). 
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further inquiry would likely be held required.  Is there ultimately some 
substantive due process violation in the blending of criminal law 
enforcement and intelligence?  Does due process preclude the 
deprivation of liberty through means that are traditionally associated 
with criminal law enforcement (arrest, detention, and incarceration), 
for the end of combating terrorism, without the venerable 
constitutional protection of a warrant?  The most recent judicial 
pronouncement on the matter notes that “the constitutional question 
presented by this case  – whether Congress’ disapproval of the 
primary purpose test is consistent with the Fourth Amendment  – has 
no definitive jurisprudential answer.”217  The narrow view of the basic 
guarantee followed by the U.S. Supreme Court would suggest it does 
not.  
C. The Future
The Canadian and American responses to the new reality are 
similar in three key respects.  First, each country’s response involves 
the criminal justice model (i.e., substantive crimes to deter conduct, 
with investigative mechanisms to enforce and punish through 
prosecutions) with aspects of the intelligence or national security 
model engrafted onto it.  In both countries, new substantive terrorism-
related offenses have been created, and authority for electronic 
surveillance and surreptitious searches has been expanded.  The 
responses in both countries also include additional administrative and 
criminal controls on the financing of terrorism.  Whether this approach 
will be most effective against terrorism is debatable,218 but what is 
unquestioned in both countries is that criminal justice matters are at 
the core of what each country’s  basic guarantee addresses.219
217 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct.Rev., Nov 18, 2002).
218See, e.g., Martin L. Friedland, Police Powers in Bill C-36, in RONALD J. DANIELS, 
PATRICK MACKLEM, & KENT ROACH eds, THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON 
CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 133-34 (TORONTO, 2001) at 273 (“Bill C-36 gives 
too much emphasis to prosecution and punishment . . . .  Our emphasis should be on 
discovering and thwarting terrorist activities before they occur.”) 
219The notion that some ultimate, substantive judgment must be made about the 
application of the restrictions imposed under the new reality has appeared in several 
cases, although not always as an explicit due process or fundamental justice matter.  
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (Foreign Int.Surv.Ct.Rev., Nov 18, 2002) 
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Criminal law enforcement measures thus almost always face scrutiny 
under the basic guarantee.  
Second, each country’s response involves an expansion of 
executive authority at the expense of judicial authority.  That is, the 
executive in each country may now take very significant steps that can 
result in the seizure of property and detention of individuals –
including citizens  – that are susceptible to very limited forms of 
judicial review.220
Third, a very significant part of the expansion of the executive 
authority in both countries is not limited to “the new reality.”221  It is 
equally applicable to traditional criminal law enforcement activities.222
(“Ultimately, the question [concerning the constitutionality of FISA orders used to 
obtain information primarily for a criminal investigation] becomes whether FISA, as 
amended by the Patriot Act, is a reasonable response based on a balance of the 
legitimate need of the government for foreign intelligence information to protect 
against national security threats with the protected rights of citizens.”).  See also note 
129, supra (Re: Hamdi & Padilla cases).
220See notes ____, supra.  A recent example of the breadth and aggressiveness of this 
expansion of executive authority is the government’s decision to effectively 
eliminate the “wall” between intelligence investigators and criminal investigators, 
which had -- by Department of Justice policy -- kept information obtained through 
FISA-authorized intrusions from being regularly shared with criminal investigators.  
See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int.Surv.Ct.Rev., Nov 18, 2002) 
(holding that PATRIOT Act eliminated requirement in FISA that “significant 
purpose” of intrusion be foreign intelligence, and that this is constitutionally 
permissible because FISA order not a “warrant,” thus not governed by fourth 
amendment), abrogating In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, 218 F.Supp.2d 611, 623 (Foreign Intel.Surv.Ct., May 17, 
2002)(denying approval of “minimization procedures” and “wall” that would have 
permitted criminal prosecutors a “significant role directing FISA surveillances and 
searches from start to finish in counterintelligence cases having overlapping 
intelligence and criminal investigations or interests, guiding them to criminal 
prosecution.  The government makes no secret of this policy, asserting its 
interpretation of the Act’s new amendments which ‘allows FISA to be used primarily 
for a law enforcement purpose.’”)
221See 50 U.S.C. 1804(a)(7)(B) (Thompson West 2003) (requiring that intelligence 
gathering need only be “a significant purpose” of FISA-authorized secret searches or 
electronic surveillance rather than “the purpose”).
222See notes ___, supra.
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Each of these aspects are likely to face challenge under each 
country’s basic guarantee.  To the extent that they involve 
criminalization and the use of the criminal process, they will arguably 
trigger enumerated criminal procedure rights.  But the essential claim 
that the new reality presents challenges that cannot be met with 
traditional law enforcement techniques alone will demand a 
substantive, proportionality judgment, which is ultimately that of the 
basic guarantee.  Whether each court has adopted a narrow or 
expansive view of this guarantee will largely condition its answer to 
this question.  
